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DOMESTIC RELATIONS:
LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE BEATING:
THEORY AND PRACTICE IN OHIO
INTRODUCTION
W IFE BEATING AND other forms of family violence are as old as the
patriarchal family.' Traditionally, such behavior has been justified as
necessary to promote discipline within the family unit, has been considered
a "personal" matter of no concern to others in the social community, or has
been minimized in its extent and severity. 2 However, in the past decade there
has been a surge of interest in woman abuse as a social problem. Shelters and
other services for victims have been established in many communities. In the
past five years, most states have enacted laws which provide special legal
remedies for victims of mate abuse or other family violence.3
In Ohio, the Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence issued
a report in 1977 which contained extensive recommendations for police depart-
ments and social services, as well as statutory relief to more effectively combat
mate abuse, child abuse and parent abuse." The Domestic Violence Act, House
Bill 835, was enacted the following year and went into effect March 27, 1979.1
Amendments intended to clarify several provisions were added with the passage
of House Bill 920 in early 1981.6
The Act contained a comprehensive program to enhance the availability
of legal relief for domestic violence victims.7 A "civil protection order" was
created,' similar to the traditional domestic relations temporary restraining order,
but with significant differences.9 The Act also created the crime of domestic
'Dobash & Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of Marital Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 427-32
(1978).
'Martin, Overview - Scope of the Problem, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 205, 208-09
(United States Commission of Civil Rights 1978).
'Lerman, Protection of Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 271
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Lerman, Survey].
4THE REPORT FROM THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Task Force].
'Am. Sub. H.B. 835, 1978 Ohio Laws 137, (codified in scattered sections of OHIO REV. CODE ANN.)
[hereinafter cited as H.B. 8351.
'Am. Sub. H.B. 920, 1981 Ohio Laws 138, (codified in OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 299.25, 2929.26, 2945.42,
3113.31, 3113.33 (Page 1981 and Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as H.B. 920].
'A separate bill (H.B. 736 eff. Oct. 6, 1980), not the subject of this comment, established a fund to promote
shelters for victims of domestic violence. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3113.33-3113.39 (Page 1980 and Supp.
1982) (as amended by H.B. 920).
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Page Supp. 1982).
9OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(H) (Page 1982). [705]
1
Grim: Domestic Relations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
violence,' 0 similar to assault but with the unique feature of a temporary pro-
tection order to protect the victim while the case is pending.'" Law enforce-
ment officers were given special authority to arrest without a warrant when
the victim signs a statement which alleges that the offense of domestic violence
has been committed.' 2 Officers must provide information to the victim about
both kinds of protection orders available under the Act.13 And all law enforce-
ment agencies must keep separate records of domestic disputes, which are to
be compiled in an annual report by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation.' In addition, the Act requires all new law officers to receive at
least fifteen hours of training in the handling of domestic disputes.' 5
Legislation, like Ohio's Domestic Violence Act, has been heralded by
battered women's advocates. Much discussion about the limitations of tradi-
tional remedies and institutional obstacles preceded the passage of such statutes;
but it takes more than words in a statute to effect change. Statutory language
can be interpreted in various ways and must withstand constitutional scrutiny. 6
Every aspect of institutional involvement can promote or hinder the purposes
of the Act. This comment examines Ohio's Domestic Violence Act in light of
actual practice and interpretations. It is hoped that an analysis of the legal opera-
tion of the Act as well as extra-legal factors will enable practitioners to use
the Domestic Violence Act, and similar statutes in other states, to more effec-
tively protect victims and society from domestic violence.
The particular focus of this comment is the application of the Domestic
Violence Act to cases of woman abuse. Although the statute applies to violence
against any household member, the greatest concern of its proponents is female
mate abuse, and this is where the vast majority of its use has been. 7 More-
over, the interpersonal and societal dynamics of parent abuse and child
abuse are different from wife abuse. Although there are similar institutional
and legal concerns, these forms of domestic violence are beyond the scope of
this comment.
'°OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page 1982).
"Id. § 2919.26.
"Id. § 2935.03(B).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(J) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.32 (Page 1980).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 109.73(A)(4)(5)(6), 109.77(B) (Page Supp. 1982).
"Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
"See TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at IV; responses to questionnaires from judges, prosecutors and law
officers. Much of the information in this article was obtained from inquiries to law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors, courts of common pleas and battered women's services in 30 counties. Replies were received
in February and March, 1982, from seven sheriff's departments, four large city policy departments, nine
county prosecutors, one city prosecutor, one municipal court judge, nine courts of common pleas and
12 battered women's projects. Inquiries were in the form of letter-questionnaires and interviews; the results
are not statistically accurate. The sample was small and many questions were deliberately open-ended.
Rather, the responses reveal the nature and variety of policies in local implementation of the Domestic
Violence Act. Particular respondents are noted where appropriate. Some respondents, primarily the battered
women's projects, wished to remain anonymous. The respondents are listed at the end of this comment,
infra, at Appendix. All replies, responses, and interviews have been verified by the Board of Editors of
the AKRON LAW REVIEW.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:4
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I. SCOPE OF THE ACT
All provisions of the Domestic Violence Act apply to "domestic violence"
between "family or household members." For both civil and criminal provi-
sions, H. B. 835 defined "family or household member" as "a spouse, person
living as a spouse, parent, child, or other person related by consanguinity or
affinity, who is residing or has resided with the offender."'"
The terms "spouse" and "person living as spouse" were subjected to a
variety of interpretations by officials involved with the Act. Some limited "per-
sons living as spouses" to persons in a common law marriage.' 9 That is, they
must hold themselves out to the community as husband and wife.20 Without
requiring a common law marriage, one court decided a minimum time of
cohabitation was needed before an unmarried party would be extended the pro-
tection of the Act.' Some authorities imposed a maximum time limit on how
long an ex-spouse or other former cohabitant had been gone from the shared
residence.22 Others simply ignored the phrase "or have resided together," and
required that the parties be living together at the time of the civil petition or
criminal complaint.23 Former spouses were also excluded on the rationale that
once a divorce had been finalized, the parties were no longer "spouses.""
Other officials and courts construed the statutes broadly. For instance,
the Tuscarawas County Court of Appeals found that the complainant was a
"person living as a spouse" where she and the defendant were the natural parents
of a three year old son; the defendant had a key to her house and had lived
with her intermittently for three years, shared her bedroom and purchased food,
clothing and furniture for the household." In another case, the Court of
Appeals of Ross County applied the criminal statute where the defendant
and the complainant had been divorced for two years.26 The court may have
been influenced by the fact that the couple had moved back together a year
'Enacted as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D) (Page Supp. 1980); Id. 3113.31(A) (Page supp. 1980).
'E.g., Dayton Police Department, Gen. Ord. 2.01-21 (issued April 1979) (officers were advised to determine
that a common law marriage exists; "mere living together is no justification in itself of a common law
marriage"). Id. at 1; but cf. letter from John Madigan, Chief Prosecutor of the City of Toledo (Feb.
23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Toledo Prosecutor] ("As long as the parties are living together as man and
wife their actual marital status is not relevant.") (Emphasis added).
"Common law marriage is recognized in Ohio when there is an agreement to marry, cohabitation, and
a repute in the community as being husband and wife. Markley v. Hudson, 143 Ohio St. 163, 54 N.E.2d
304 (1944).
"In Brooke v. Pozna, No. 81-10-3870 (Summit County C.P. Oct. 7, 1981), the court dismissed a petition
for a CPO on Oct. 27, 1981, because the petitioner had been living with the offender for only three weeks.
"Opinion No. 79-20, Paul R. Donaldson, Law Director of Shaker Heights (April 5, 1979) (thirty days).
"E.g., Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 19; letter from Gregory G. Brown, Assistant Prosecutor, Ashtabula
County (Feb. 12, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Ashtabula Co. Prosecutor].
"State v. Scudder, No. C-810205 (Hamilton County Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1982) (available in Ohio App.
Dec. on Fiche, 82-7-1d); Akron Police Dept., Supp. to P-79-011 (June 4, 1980).
"State v. Harris, No. 1384 (Tuscarawas County Ct. App. Nov. 29, 1979).
"Chillicothe v. Copp, No. 834 (Ross County Ct. App. 1981) (available in Ohio Dec. on Fiche 81-15-4d).
Spring, 1983]
3
Grim: Domestic Relations
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
after the divorce and had separated again two months before the incident. If
so, the court impliedly considered the co-habiting ex-wife to be a "person living
as spouse" without discussion of the requirements of common law marriage.
In practice, police, prosecutors and trial courts showed varying degrees
of liberality in extending the coverage of the Domestic Violence Act to unmarried
couples and couples who were no longer living together at the time of the
incident." The narrower interpretations are inconsistent with the intent or actual
language of the Act. The principal sponsor of the Act, Representative David
Hartley, has stated that the Act was intended to cover any disputes which occur
"as a result of living together.''"
To limit "persons living as spouses" to common law marriage is incon-
sistent with the plain language of the Act. Persons married by operation of
common law are not merely living together as spouses - they are spouses.9
"Persons living as spouses" can have an independent meaning only if it applies
to couples other than those in a legal marriage, be it statutory or common law.
Refusals to extend the Act to ex-spouses were inconsistent with the
legislature's intent in adding the phrase "or have resided together." Earlier
versions of the bill were limited to current cohabitants,3" or, in criminal matters,
included specific time periods after which the Domestic Violence Act would
not apply;3" but, as Representative Hartley explained:
[The committee] had considerable testimony on the high incidence of
domestic violence following the dissolution of a domestic relationship.
especially where children and visitation rights are involved. The new
language was specifically intended to deal with domestic violence which
might occur following a break up of a domestic relationship, be it marriage
or otherwise. 2
In some cases, disputes arising from that relationship went on for several
years, and the Act was intended to cover such situations.3 I In the Ross County
case of Chillicothe v. Copp, the court suggested that an ex-spouse could be
"Responses to questionnaires from the Licking County Prosecutor, Pike County Prosecutor, Sandusky
County Prosecutor, Stark County Prosecutor, Crawford County Mun. Ct., Cleveland Police Dept.,
Columbus Police Dept., Youngstown Police Dept., Ashtabula County Sheriff's Office, Athens County
Sheriff's Office, Ross County Sheriff's Office, Sandusky County Sheriff's Office, Stark County Sheriff's
Office, Trumbull County Sheriff's Office, Wayne County Sheriff's Office, Franklin County Dom. Rel.
Ct., Lucas County Dom. Rel. Ct., Mahoning County Dom. Rel. Ct., various shelters, see infra, at Appendix.
"Interview with David Hartley (Feb. 23, 1982).
"In Re Estate of Partlow, 105 Ohio App. 189, 146 N.E.2d 147 (Cuyahoga County 1957).
"Sub. H.B. 835 at 6 (as introduced in the Judiciary Comm.), 112th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. 1977-1978; S.B.
514 at 3, 112th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. 1977-1978 (to be enacted as OHIOREV. CODE ANN. §§ 3113.31(A)(1);
3119.01(B) respectively).
"Sub. H.B. 835 at 6 (six months); S.B. 514 at 3 (two years) (to be enacted as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2903.13(C); 2919.24(C) respectively).
"Letter from David Hartley (Sept. 12, 1979).
"31d.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:4
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excluded from the scope of "family or household member" if the clause "who
is residing or has resided with the offender" were construed to modify
only "other person related by consanguinity or affinity." The court rejected
this interpretation because it "ignores the evil which the legislature sought to
remedy.""
In response to these narrow interpretations, House Bill 920 (effective April
9, 1981) amended these sections to provide explicitly that "family or household
members" includes "a former spouse" and that a" '[p]erson living as a spouse'
means a person who is living with another in a common law marital relation-
ship or otherwise cohabiting with another." 5 This amendment has led some
jurisdictions to change their procedures, 6 but ten months after the amendment
was enacted, official policy statements of some jurisdictions indicated no change
in their interpretation." H. B. 920 did not explicitly respond to the imposition
of time limits on the phrase "reside or have resided together," so these inter-
pretations continue.
An unusual twist was considered by the Lake County Court of Appeals
in State v. Peine.s8 The complaining witness was an adult woman who lived
with her mother and was assaulted by a man who cohabited with her mother.
The court held that the criminal provisions of The Domestic Violence Act did
not apply: the complainant was not a "child, or other person related by con-
sanguinity or affinity who is residing. . . with the offender." "Consanguinity"
imports relationship through a common ancestor. "Affinity" is a relationship
by marriage. Because the complainant had no blood relationship with the of-
fender, she would qualify only if her mother were married to him. In dicta,
the court said that the amended language defining "person living as spouse"
to include one "who is otherwise cohabiting with another" would not affect
the result in this case because it did not alter the meaning of the word affinity
to include a relationship by one who was cohabiting with another. However,
this technical interpretation conflicts with the policy shown by the legislative
history and clarifying amendments that "family or household member" be
broadly construed.
Turning to what conduct the Act covers, "domestic violence" is defined
"Chillicothe v. Copp, No. 834 (Ross County Ct. App. 1981) (available in Ohio Dec. on Fiche 81-5-4d).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(D) (Page 1982) (emphasis added); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3113.31(A) (Page Supp. 1982). Although Scudder asserts that this amendment was a substantive change
which was not retroactive, the legislative history shows that the amendment was intended merely to clarify
the meaning intended by the original enmactment. Accord, Copp, Slip. Op. at 6, n.l.
"Dayton Police Dept. Gen. Order 2.01-2 (revised June 1982) (domestic disputes include "boyfriend/girlfriend
type relationships, spouses, living as spouses," etc.); responses from several battered women's projects,
infra, at Appendix.
"E.g., Akron Police Dept., letter enclosed with Supp. 79-011; Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 20.
"State v. Peine, No. 8-202 (Lake County Ct. App. March 1, 1982) (available in Ohio Dec. on Fiche,
82-4-11d). (The situation was unusual because where the complaining witness is a juvenile, child abuse
statutes would probably be invoked in preference to the Domestic Violence Act.)
Spring, 1983]
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differently in the civil and criminal provisions of the Act. For the civil protec-
tion order:
"Domestic violence" means the occurrence of one or more of the following
acts between family or household members who reside together or have
resided together:
(a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;
(b) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent
serious physical harm;
(c) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in
the child being an abused child, as defined in § 2151.031 of the
Revised Code.39
Conduct subject to criminal sanctions is more narrowly defined:
(A) No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical
harm to a family or household member.
(B) No person shall recklessly cause serious physical harm to a family
or household member.
4 0
Thus, both sections are applicable where physical harm is knowingly caused
or attempted. Where there is the less culpable mental state of recklessness, the
criminal sanctions apply only with "serious physical harm, whereas the civil
protection order applies when any injury results. A mere threat of force is suf-
ficient to invoke the civil order but not to sustain a criminal charge.
Neither section includes psychological abuse, although many victims of
domestic violence report that the psychological abuse is more devastating than
the physical harm.4 1 Likewise, neither section includes sexual abuse, although
this is a common form of wife abuse. 2
II. CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER
A. Statutory Provisions
Section 3113.31 provides for a protection order or consent agreement
available through a court of common pleas (domestic relations division, in coun-
ties which have one). A person may seek this relief on her own behalf, or any
adult household member may petition on behalf of another household member. 3
The Act explicitly provides that a "petitioner's right to relief under this sec-
tion is not affected by [her] leaving the residence or household to avoid fur-
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
'4OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page 1982).
41L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 66 (1979); See A. BOYLAND & N. TAUB, ADULT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES 31 (1981).
4
2L. WALKERSUpra note 41, at 95-112. But see MASs. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 209A § 1(c) (West Supp. 1982).
Ohio's sex offense statutes exempt acts perpetrated against the spouse of the offender unless there is a
written separation agreement, a pending action for annulment, divorce, dissolution or alimony, or a judgment
for alimony. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.07.01(L) - 2907.06 (Page 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3113.31(C) (Page Supp. 1982).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:4
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ther domestic violence.""" Also, choice of this remedy does not preclude any
other available civil or criminal remedy."
An order may be issued exparte on the same day that the petition is filed,
upon a finding of "[i]mmediate and present danger of domestic violence." The
necessary finding "includes, but is not limited to, situations in which the
respondent has threatened the family or household member with bodily harm,
or in which the respondent has previously engaged in domestic violence against
the family or household member."4 , Where an ex parte order excludes the
respondent from the shared residence, a full hearing must be scheduled within
seven days. ' With any other exparte order, a full hearing must be held within
ten days. If there is no exparte order, then a full hearing should be scheduled
as in any other civil action. The respondent is to be given notice of and an
opportunity to be heard at the full hearing."
The court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agree-
ment "to bring about a cessation of domestic violence."4 9 The order or agree-
ment may:
- direct the respondent to refrain from abuse;
- order the respondent to vacate the shared residence5" or provide alternate
housing;
- award temporary custody of children or establish temporary visitation
rights;
- require the respondent to maintain support which he has customarily
provided or which he has a legal duty to provide;
- require the respondent, petitioner, victim of domestic violence, or any
combination of those persons, to seek counseling;
- require the respondent to refrain from entering the residence, school,
business, or place of employment of the victim;
- direct the respondent to permit the use of a motor vehicle by the
petitioner or other family or household member;
- direct the apportionment of household personal property; and
- grant other equitable and fair relief.5"
"Id. § 3113.31(B).
"Id. § 3113.31(G).
"Id. § 3113.31(D).
"Id.; H.B. 835 provided for three days, but H.B. 920 as codified, expanded the time to seven days. Id.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D) (Page Supp. 1982).
"Id. § 3113.31(E)(1).
"H.B. 835 failed to explicitly authorize an order to vacate when the residence is jointly owned or leased
by the parties, Am. Sub. H.B. 835 at 12 (eff. March 27, 1979), and at least one court held that it was
powerless to do so. Legislative Service Commission, Am. Sub. H.B. 920 (as reported by S. Judiciary)
at 6 (n.d.). H.B. 920 filled this gap. The amending bill also substituted "order to vacate" for inappropriate
language about "evicting" a respondent who is sole owner or lessee, since eviction is removal of person
from property wrongfully held. Id.
'Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E) (Page Supp. 1982).
Spring, 19831 DOMESTIC RELATIONS
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However, "[n]o order or agreement under this section shall in any manner affect
title to any real property." 5 If there has been a prior civil protection order
involving the same parties, the new order may include "a prohibition against
the respondent returning to the residence or household and a prohibition against
the petitioner inviting or admitting the respondent to the residence or household
while the order is in effect." 53
An order or consent agreement can be for a fixed period of time, up to
one year. However, if either party files an action for divorce, dissolution or
separate maintenance, then any order of temporary custody, visitation or sup-
port under the Domestic Violence Act must end within sixty days.5 Copies
of the order or agreement are to be issued to the petitioner, respondent, and
all law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction to enforce it, and a copy should
be delivered to the respondent on the same day the order is entered.55 The statute
further provides that "[a]ny officer of a law enforcement agency shall enforce
a protection order or consent agreement in accordance with [its] provisions
... including removing the respondent from the premises, where appropriate." 6
A violator may also be held in contempt of court and sentenced to up to ten
days in jail.57
B. Comparison with Temporary Restraining Order
The domestic violence civil protection order (CPO) is similar to the tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) and temporary orders of alimony, child sup-
port and custody which may be issued in an action for divorce, annulment
or "alimony only" (separate maintenance),58 but there are important differences.
First, the CPO is available to a broader class of plaintiffs. In addition to spouses,
it may apply to other family or household members, including unmarried
cohabitants and former spouses. In contrast to divorce, there is no residency
requirement, 9 and, it is an independent action. Although a married person
could get a restraining order against a spouse without the Domestic Violence
Act, that action for immediate protection must be tied to a long-term decision
about the relationship. 0 Thus, a battered wife has been forced to file a
12Id. § 3113.31(E)(4).
"Id. § 3113.31(E)(2).
"Id. § 3113.31(E)(3).
"Id. § 3113.31(F)(1).
56Id. § 3113.31(F)(3).
"Id. § 3113.31(H), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.05 (Page 1981).
"OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(H) and (M) (Page 1982).
"The plaintiff in an action for divorce or annulment must have been a resident of Ohio for six months,
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.03 (Page 1980), and of the county in which the action is filed for ninety
days. OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(B)(9) (Page 1982).
"An alimony action, with a TRO, may be used for a trial separation, but it is designed to effect a permanent
legal separation without technically ending the marriage. The final order is a permanent order. Theoretically,
Civil Rule 65, which governs non-domestic restraining orders, could be invoked when there is no divorce,
annulment or alimony action. But the procedure is more cumbersome and, unlike Rule 75 restraining orders,
the plaintiff must post bond. OHiO R. Civ. P. 65, 75 (Page 1982).
[Vol. 16:4
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divorce or alimony action which she would later drop, since a temporary separa-
tion can lead to reconciliation as well as to permanent separation. 6' Also, a
TRO may remain in force only "during the pendency" of the underlying
action." If the threat of abuse continues after the divorce, annulment, or alimony
action is concluded, the CPO may provide relief which is otherwise unavailable.
In addition to the fact that the domestic violence civil protection order
applies to more situations than the traditional TRO, there are other differences
in the types of relief available. Civil Rule 75 provides that a TRO can prevent
a party from disposing of or encumbering property, or from causing physical
abuse or annoyance to the other party or a child.3 This potentially provides
for the relief authorized by a domestic violence order, but courts may be more
willing to exercise their broad equity powers under the authority of the explicit
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Rule
75 authorizes an order requiring counseling, nor can it authorize an order of
support based on actual dependence where there is no independent legal
duty. This relief is explicitly authorized by the Domestic Violence Act.6"
In some counties, a domestic violence protection order can be obtained
more quickly than a TRO. Although the rules allow restraining orders and tem-
porary orders to be issued ex parte, some courts will not issue these orders
without notice to the other party. In contrast to Rule 75, the Domestic Violence
Act requires that an ex parte hearing be held the same day it is requested.6 5
The CPO is also potentially more effectively enforceable. A traditional
TRO can be enforced only through the general contempt powers of the court,
which require a separate hearing and finding of contempt and may involve
a delay of several days. Although a domestic violence order is enforceable in
the same way 66 the Act also provides that law officers shall enforce the order
or agreement in accordance with its provisions, "including removing the respon-
dent from the premises, where appropriate. ' 67 In a few jurisdictions the
authority of police is made still clearer by a local ordinance which makes the
violation of a civil or criminal domestic violence order a misdemeanor.6 8 Where
police have demonstrated their willingness to give automatic enforcement to
domestic violence orders, attorneys have obtained better results under the
61Accord, Galvin, Ohio's New Civil Remedies for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 OHIO NORTHERN L.
REV. 248, 260 (1981) (noting that seventy-five percent of those who filed domestic siolence petitions in
Lucas County in 1979 had not terminated their marriages, nor filed actions to do so, as of March, 1981).
1"OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(H) (Page 1982).
6Id.
6"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(l)(e) and (f) (Page Supp. 1982).
6'Compare OHIO R. Civ. P. 75(H) ("[a] temporary restraining order may be issued without notice .... ")
(emphasis added) with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 I(D) (Page Supp. 1982) ("[t]he court shall hold an
ex parte hearing on the same day that the petition is filed.") (emphasis added).
66OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(H) (Page Supp. 1982).
671d. § 3113.31(F)(3).
6
'See infra note 94.
Spring, 1983]
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Domestic Violence Act 9.6
Although the domestic violence civil protection order or consent agree-
ment is similar to the traditional domestic relations restraining order, the
domestic violence order has substantive and procedural features which may
make it preferable even where the traditional orders would be available. For
cases involving abuse by someone other than a spouse, or for a married per-
son who does not seek to end the relationship, the domestic violence order pro-
vides unique relief.7"
C. Relief Available
The relief authorized by this statute is well tailored to the needs of abused
women. In nearly all cases, the basic order to refrain from abuse would be
ineffective unless combined with an order to stay away, both of which are
authorized." The statutory preference that the abuser bear the burden of finding
alternate housing is appropriate, especially when the alternative is putting this
burden on a woman accompanied by children.
The availability of an ex parte order is often critical. Any delay during
which the parties continue to share a residence entails a substantial risk of harm
to the petitioner. When an ex parte hearing is requested, the statute requires
that it be held on the same day.7 However, there is no provision for obtaining
a civil protection order at night or on weekends. 3 In an emergency, a battered
woman's options are to call the police and invoke the criminal law or to flee.
While nonabuse, exclusion from the home and stay away orders are crucial
ingredients of a basic protection order, other terms may also be important to
provide adequate and realistic relief. Ohio's statute explicitly authorizes several
types of relif. An award of temporary child custody ", may be critical if there
is a danger of child-snatching. In the absence of a court determination of
custody, both parents have equal rights to physical custody of the child, and
there is no recourse against a parent who absconds with his or her child.75
Financial dependency is often a significant pressure which prevents a
woman from taking steps which might protect her from abuse.7 6 A protection
order or consent agreement may require the respondent to maintain support
if he has a legal duty to do so, or if he has customarily provided or contributed
"
9Galvin, supra note 61, at 261.
"OOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
"Id. § 3113.31(E)(1)(b) and (c).
"Id. § 3113.31(D)
"Nine states provide for emergency protection orders to be issued at times when regular courts are not
in session. Lerman, Survey, supra note 3, at 273.
7'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(d) (Page Supp. 1982).
"1OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.08 (Page 1976).
"Martin, supra note 2, at 215.
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to such support.77 Under Ohio law, a man has a duty to support his wife and
children.7" The Act would also allow a support order in other cases, such as
where a man has been supporting a woman with whom he has been cohabiting
or children who are not legally or biologically his. In addition, related provi-
sions were added in 1981, allowing an order to provide for the apportionment
of household personal property and to require the respondent to permit the
use of a motor vehicle by the petitioner or other household member.79
The Act also authorizes an order or agreement to require any or all of
the household members to seek counseling."0 This is in accord with the wishes
of many victims and may be a way to deal with the problem beyond what a
mere protective order could accomplish. Many abused women would prefer,
at least as a first step, to work to improve their relationship.8 ' However, the
abusive mate typically denies that his behavior is any part of the problem, 2
and the constant threat of abuse creates a coercive environment which makes
mutual give-and-take unlikely. The CPO or consent agreement may provide
an environment conducive to reconciliation by enforcing a trial separation while
one or all of the parties participate in an appropriate counseling program. While
therapists generally believe that counseling is ineffective when the client's par-
ticipation is not voluntary, the experience of some programs suggests that court-
ordered counseling of men who batter their mates may be effective.I3 Offenders
characteristically deny responsibility for their behavior, they are often
externally motivated and would more readily take steps which are required of
them than they would on their own." ' Traditional family counseling, which
emphasizes group process, may reinforce the tendency of both abuser and abused
to blame the victim, but there has been some success with therapy that focuses
on individual responsibility for the violence.8 5 The value of this sort of order
may hinge upon the availability of appropriate counseling services, but it is
clearly an option which many women would like to try.
The Act also contains a curious provision, added in the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which states that where there has been a previous civil protection
order involving the same parties, the court may prohibit the respondent from
returning and prohibit the petitioner from inviting the respondent to the residence
or household while the order is in effect.8 6 In substance, this adds little to orders
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1)(e) (Page Supp. 1982).
"sOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page 1980).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (E)(1)(h) (Page Supp. 1982).
soId. § 3113.31(E)(1)(f).
"See L. WALKER, supra note 41, at 149, 212.
"Id. at 30.
"Lerman, Criminal Prosecution of Wife Beaters, 4 RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 1, 1l, 12 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Lerman, Prosecution].
84Id.
"Id. at 12; L WALKER, supra note 41, at 216-219.
6OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(2) (Page Supp. 1982).
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to vacate the residence and refrain from entering. Presumably, the point of
the additional prohibition on the petitioner would be to emphasize to both parties
that the court considers this more than a private agreement. If the abusive party
attempts to sweet-talk his way back into the household, the petitioner can bolster
her resistance by pointing to the prohibition directed to her. This seems con-
descending, but perhaps it could be significant. In the cycle of abuse, a burst
of violence is typically followed by remorse and sweetness. s7 Victims are often
aware that this is part of a cycle, but their concern for the individual, and hope
for the relationship, makes the calm periods difficult to resist."8
In addition to the terms specifically enumerated, the Act authorizes the
court to "[g]rant other relief that the court considers equitable and fair. .... ",89
This would allow terms tailored to particular situations, perhaps including terms
specifically authorized in other domestic violence statutes, such as attorneys
fees, court costs, or compensation for losses due to abuse. 90
D. Enforcement
Ultimately, the value of a protection order turns upon the likelihood that
it will be obeyed or enforced. The Act provides for two ways of treating a vio-
lation of a protection order: immediate removal of the violator and contempt
proceedings. 91 A finding of contempt of court could result in imprisonment
of up to ten days or a fine of up to $500.00, as some courts warn in bold type
on their orders.92 But the contempt procedure, which is also the remedy for
the traditional domestic relations restraining order, does not provide immediate
protection to the victim. Law officers generally have no authority under the
order of a civil court until there is a contempt warrant or other enforcement
order following a contempt hearing. Thus, the victim's remedy is to summon
the offender to a hearing which may be held several days later. If she calls
the police, they may come to the residence, they may ask the offender to leave,
and they may even threaten to arrest him. But if he calls their bluff, police
have no authority to remove him unless he commits a criminal act.
The Domestic Violence Act, however, includes language intended to allow
immediate enforcement: "[a]ny officer of a law enforcement agency shall en-
force a protection order or consent agreement in accordance with the provi-
sions of the order or agreement, including removing the respondent from the
premises, where appropriate." 93 This provision is reinforced by requirements
"L. WALKER, supra note 41, at 49-61.
"Of the common pleas courts which responded to the author's inquiries, none had ever used this provision
except Montgomery County (Dayton), which routinely includes it in all "stay-away" orders. Galvin suggests
that such a provision is close to being in restraint of marriage. Galvin, supra note 61, at 260.
"1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(l)(h) (Page Supp. 1982) (as amended by H.B. 920).
"See A. BOYLAND & N. TAUB, supra note 41, at 70.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(3) and (H) (Page Supp. 1982).
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.05 (Page 1981). This warning is printed on the forms used by the domestic
relations courts of Lucas and Mahoning Counties. Response to questionnaries, infra, at Appendix.
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(3) (Page Supp. 1982). Cf. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 737.11 (Page Supp.
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that a copy of any order or agreement be issued "to all law enforcement agen-
cies that have jurisdiction to enforce [it], .. ." and that all law enforcement
agencies maintain an index of such orders." This should allow prompt verifica-
tion of an order when the victim is not able to produce a copy.
Still, the extent of authority under this provision is unclear. The statute
does not authorize a law officer to arrest the violator based merely upon his
presence on the premises in violation of a domestic violence order. Removing
the man from the doorstep to the sidewalk may be scant protection when the
police leave. In a growing number of Ohio cities, this problem has been resolved
by local ordinances which state that a violation of a civil or criminal protec-
tion order is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.95 By making a violation a
crime in itself, law officers are given clear authority under their arrest powers
to take into custody anyone who commits a violation in their presence.96 The
sponsors attempted to incorporate a similar provision into the Domestic Violence
Act but were unsuccessful. 97
E. Constitutional Issues
Due process questions are raised by an exparte order that removes a per-
son from his or her home. The respondent may be deprived of interests in pro-
perty (his home) and liberty (contact with his children) without notice or an
opportunity to be heard.
This issue was considered by the legislature. 9 The extent of the property
deprivation was expressly limited by a proviso stating that "[nlo order or agree-
1982) (requiring municipal police to enforce all domestic violence orders, civil and criminal).
"Id. § 3113.31(F)(1); (2) (the index requirement was added by H.B. 920).
"E.g., COLUMBUS GEN. OFFENSES § 2321.07 (1979): Temporary protection order.
(A) No person shall knowlingly violate any terms of a Temporary Protection Order issued pursuant
to Section 2919.26 R.C. or Section 3113.31 R.C.
(B) No person shall recklessly enter or remain on the land or premises which is the subject of a
Temporary Protection Order issued pursuant to Section 2919.26 R.C. or Section 3113.31 R.C.,
when such protection order excludes the person from the land or the premises.
(C) No person, being on the land or the premises subject to a Temporary Protection Order issued
pursuant to Section 2919.26 R.C. or Section 3113.31 R.C. shall negligently fail to refuse to
to leave such premises upon being notified that the Protection Order excludes such person from
that land or premises.
(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of violation of a Temporary Protection Order, a
misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
(E) As used in this section "land or premises" includes any land, real property, building, structure,
home, or apartment, and any separate enclosure or room, or portion thereof. (Ord. 1147-79).
The future of such ordinances is uncertain since this Ordinance was recently invalidated by the Tenth
District Court of Appeals in Columbus v. Patterson, No. 82-AP-47 (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1982).
"A law enforcement officer "shall arrest and detain ... a person found violating ... a law of this state
or an ordinance of municipal corporation." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A) (Page 1982).
"Sub. H.B. 835, introduced in the House Judiciary Committee, would have made violation of a civil
protection order a felony of the fourth degree, 112th Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. at 9. H.B. 920, as introduced,
would have made violation of a civil or criminal protection order a fourth degree misdemeanor, 112th
Gen. Ass. Reg. Sess. at 5.
"E.g., Women in Crisis: Testimony Before House Judiciary Comm. on Legal Questions Raised by Sub.
H.B. 835 (n.d.).
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ment under this section shall in any manner affect title to any real property.""
A further limitation in the provision is that no order can last for more than
one year.' 00 Furthermore, the statute was carefully drawn to meet the procedural
requirements set out by the United States Supreme Court in cases involving
exparte orders. These requirements are: (1) The plaintiff must state facts rather
than conclusory allegations, by affidavit or testimony; (2) A judge must par-
ticipate in the decision; (3) There must be a provision for a prompt post-seizure
hearing where the plaintiff must present proof and the defendant may present
a defense.' For Ohio's civil protection order: (1) The petition must allege "that
the respondent engaged in domestic violence against a family or household
member .... including a description of the nature and extent of the domestic
violence";' 2 (2) Good cause, defined as "immediate and present danger" of
domestic violence, must be shown at an ex parte hearing before a judge;'0 3
(3) A full hearing, with notice to the respondent and an opportunity to be heard,
must be held within seven court days after an ex parte hearing.0 "
Similar statutes have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri'
and by a Pennsylvania trial court.0 6 These courts noted that the procedure
affected significant private interests which are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment but that these interests had to be balanced against the govern-
ment's interest in aiding victims of domestic violence.'0 7 The ex parte restric-
tions on the respondent's use of property and contact with his children were
found to be a legitimate use of the police power because they were necessary
to protect victims and prevent further abuse; the procedures for exparte orders,
with a later hearing, were held to be sufficiently protective of the respondent's
constitutional rights.0 8
The Missouri case also upheld a provision that made a violation of a pro-
tection order a misdemeanor, similar to the ordinances passed in several Ohio
19OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(4) (Page Supp. 1982).
'"Id. § 3113.31(E)(3).
"'Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(C)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
'"Id. § 3113.31(D).
"'Id. As originally enacted, the statute required a full hearing within three days. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3113.31(D) (Page 1980) (as enacted by H.B. 835). Practical difficulties in obtaining service prompted
an amendment in H.B. 920, enlarging the time to seven days. Interview with David Hartley, supra note
28; Galvin, supra note 61, at 255.
'State ex rel. Williams v. March, 626 S.W. 2d 223, 229-32 (Mo. banc 1982).
106Boyle v. Boy, 5 FAM. L. REP. 2916 (Allegheny County C.P. 1979).
"'1626 S.W. 2d at 230.
'"Id. at 232; accord, Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks
for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 95 (1980). Taub concludes that exparte evictions of alleged
domestic abusers would survive constitutional attack under either the standard of "presumptive
constitutionality" which she discerns in recent Supreme Court cases involving provisional deprivation of
protected interests, or under a stricter standard of "presumptive unconstitutionality," which shows more
sensitivity to due process values. In fact, she contends, these procedures "represent an important mechanism
for promoting those values." Id. at 128.
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cities. The state supreme court rejected the lower court's conclusion that this
provision was void for vagueness. 1 9 The court held that sufficient standards
to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory application by judges were contained
in the requirement that a protection order may be issued only upon a finding
of "immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner"'' 0 coupled with
a precise statutory definition of abuse' (the provisions in the Missouri statute
are substantially similar to the provisions in the Ohio statute I2). Secondly, ade-
quate notice to the potential offender of what conduct is proscribed is guaranteed
by the terms of the Missouri statute: the misdemeanor status attaches only to
an order of which the respondent has notice." 3
In Ohio, however, the Columbus ordinance was recently ruled invalid by
the Tenth District Court of Appeals in an unreported opinion, based on a sec-
tion of the Ohio Constitution which provides that municipalities may adopt
and enforce local police regulations so long as they "are not in conflict with
general laws."'" The court held that the city has overstepped this limitation
by criminalizing an act which the legislature had classified as noncriminal.
Whether this reasoning will be adopted by other courts of appeals or by the
Ohio Supreme Court remains to be seen. Even if piecemeal local enactment
of protection order-misdemeanor ordinances is forestalled," 5 this rationale
would of course be irrelevant to a statewide statute having the same effect.
F. Under-Usage
The civil protection order has been the cornerstone of domestic violence
laws in many states because it provides the victim with an enforceable legal
right and avoids many of the personal and institutional difficulties and limita-
tions of a criminal remedy. I I6 Yet, this remedy has had very little use in Ohio.
In some counties, there have been no domestic violence petitions filed in the
court of common pleas since the law went into effect in March, 1979, and even
populous Franklin County, which includes the city of Columbus, reported only
"09626 S.W. 2d at 232-34.
"'Id. at 233; see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
1Abuse is defined as "inflicting, other than by accidental means, or attempting to inflict physical injury
on an adult, or purposely placing another adult in apprehension of immediate physical injury." Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 455.010(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
"2Cf OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)(1); (D) (Page Supp. 1982).
'1626 S.W.2d at 233; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(3) (Vernon Supp. 1982) states: "[vliolation of the terms
and conditions of an ex parte order of protection, of which the respondent has notice, shall be a class
C misdemeanor. Violation of the terms and conditions of a full order of protection shall be a class C
misdemeanor." Id.
"'Columbus v. Patterson, No. 82 AP-47 (Franklin County Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1982); see OHIO CONST.
art. XVIIl, § 3.
1"E.g., Letter from Michael R. Merz, presiding judge of the Dayton Municipal Court, to Nancy Grigsby
of the Dayton Battered Woman Project (Feb. 9, 1973) (declining to support a Columbus-type ordinance
in Dayton in light of Patterson, since one judge from the Montgomery County Court of Appeals had
participated (by designation) in the Franklin County decision).
I"Lerman, Survey, supra note 3 at 272.
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forty-three cases in nearly three years." Lucas County (Toledo) is an excep-
tion, with 300 cases per year.'
The limited use of this remedy throughout most of the state is not because
there is little need for it or because the statute is not suited to its purposes.
Rather, court procedures, indifference or ignorance of attorneys and court per-
sonnel, and enforcement problems frustrate the ability of victims to obtain the
relief intended for them. Lucas County has shown that the protection order
will be used when attorneys and judges try to understand the needs of battered
women and to remove institutional obstacles.
Indeed, some features of the statute would seem to promote broad use
of the civil protection order. The class of people eligible to use it is broadly
defined, in contrast to previously available domestic relations orders and to
domestic violence legislation in other states."1 9 Also, the statute explicitly
guarantees that an order must not be denied to anyone because she takes the
immediate self-help measure of leaving the residence or because she pursues
other civil or criminal remedies. 12
0
There are several factors which explain its limited use. A major reason
is that few attorneys are aware of the domestic violence civil protection order,
and fewer still appreciate its usefulness.' 2 ' Perhaps lawyers believe that the
domestic violence protection order has no advantage over the familiar TRO.
Superficially there is some force to this argument. In many situations, both
remedies might be available. However, as discussed above, there are impor-
tant differences between the CPO and the TRO which may make the domestic
violence order more appropriate in many cases where a Rule 75 restraining order
is also an option.'
2
A similar view compares the exparte civil protection order to the criminal
temporary protection order. One judge opined:
It is my estimation that most emergency situations result in utilization
of the misdemeanor provision of the law. Once a temporary protective
"Letter from John W. Hill, J., Div. of Doam. Rel., Franklin County (Feb. 8, 1982); "less than 20," letter
from Div. of Dom. Rel., Mahoning County (Feb. 4, 1982); "several ... during the first year ... and
virtually none since .... ", letter from H. F. Inderlied, Jr., J., Ct. of C.P. Geauga County (Feb. 5, 1982);
"four", letter from Delphine Crowe, Bailiff, Ct. of C.P., Greene County (Feb. 8, 1982); none, letters
from Joseph P. Malone, J., Ct. of C.P., Ashtabula County (Feb. 4, 1982) and Nelfred G. Kimerline,
J., Ct. of C.P., Crawford County (Feb. 10, 1982). Montgomery County reported increasing use each year,
with 21 filings in 1979, 30 in 1980, 54 in 1981, and 22 in first quarter of 1982. Letter from Lillian M.
Kern, J., Div. of Dom. Rel., Montgomery County (March 25, 1982).
"'Letter from June R. Galvin, J., Div. of Dom. Rel. (Feb. 10, 1982); Galvin, supra note 61, at 263 n.33.
"'See Lerman, Survey, supra note 3 at 276-77 and 280-81.
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(B), (G) (Page Supp. 1982). See A. BOYLAND & N. TAUB, supra note
41, at 120 (discussing the law of various states as to election of remedies).
"'Letter from Susan Weaver, Director of Legal Dept., Div. of Dom. Rel., Cuyahoga County Ct. of C.P.
(Mar. 4, 1982); letter from Div. of Dom. Rel., Mahoning County, supra note 117.
".See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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order of that statute is in effect little need seems to exist for a civil pro-
tection order under this one. Subsequently, there is reconciliation or pro-
ceedings to terminate the marriage. In either case, a civil protection order
seems inapposite."'
This view ignores an important purpose of the civil protection order: to pro-
vide an immediate remedy without criminal prosecution. Indeed, this view en-
courages people to make criminal complaints with no intention of carrying
through with prosecution, just to get a temporary protection order.
Another hindrance to use of the CPO is the cost of hiring a lawyer and
the difficulty of following court procedures without one. Often a battered
woman has no money at her disposal, even where there is a substantial family
income. 14 To require her to retain a lawyer at a cost of several hundred dollars
may be equivalent to an outright denial of relief. Even the relatively small cost
of a typical filing fee' 25 is prohibitive to someone with no money on hand,
particularly if she also has children to feed.
The court in Lucas County has addressed these procedural and financial
problems. Judge June Galvin explained, "[a] consensus decision was reached
by the professional staff and judges that the legislature, in mandating that court
hold a same-day hearing, also intended that the petition be filed at the option
of the petitioner solely without the delay of counsel preparing pleadings,
arranging appointments, etc."' 26 A domestic violence kit was prepared, including
a petition form that can be completed without the aid of an attorney.There
is no filing fee. ' This procedure has been so effective that lawyers commonly
refer their clients to the court to file domestic violence actions.' 8
Another important factor in whether women seek protection orders is the
willingness of courts to grant the relief needed to protect victims from further
violence. For instance, the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County, which
reported that it would not issue CPO's exparte, had only four cases from 1979
through 1981. 29
Finally, even a very broad order has little value if everyone believes that
the order will not be enforced. As discussed above, the Domestic Violence Act
explicitly authorizes law officers to enforce a protection order or consent agree-
ment, including removing the violator from the premises. 3 Some law enforce-
"'Letter from H. F. Inderlied, Jr., supra note 117.
'ID. Martin, supra note 2, at 215.
" Seven courts as listed supra note 117, reported filing fees ranging from $0 to $75 for a domestic violence
petition. Telephone interviews (Feb. 19, 1982).
"'Galvin, supra note 61, at 254.
'Court staff provide intake service. Id. Court costs must be paid before the case is dismissed. Id. at 262.
"'Letter from J. Galvin, supra note 118.
'"Supra note 117.
'*OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(3) (Page Supp. 1982) and text accompanying note 93, supra.
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ment agencies nevertheless take the same "hands off" position in regard to
domestic violence orders as to traditional TROs.1"
Other agencies treat a CPO more seriously, recognizing the fact that this
order was issued means that violence has occurred previously, and will remove
the offender. I" In some jurisdictions, the department protocol permits arrest
for criminal trespass or disorderly conduct. 33 Some law enforcement agencies
prefer to have the orders include provisions which expressly authorize the sheriff
or police department to remove the offender."'3 Enforcement might be enhanced
in other jurisdictions if courts would adopt the practice of including explicit
enforcement directions on orders when they are issued. This would clearly bring
any violation within the Act's mandate that "any officer . . . shall enforce
...in accordance with the provision." 35 Courts and attorneys should also
make sure that copies of the order are issued "to all law enforcement agencies
that have jurisdiction to enforce [it]," 36 as well as the places where the peti-
tioner lives, works, and goes to school.
At best, however, the authority to remove remains somewhat uncertain
under the statute. As one shelter worker reports: "[rlemove yes - but to where?
The corner?" 37 The surest enforcement is available in those cities which have
enacted ordinances making violation of a domestic violence protection order
an arrestable offense.' 38 An amendment to the statute is needed to extend this
provision to all parts of the state. But even the existing law allows a great deal
more protective action by law officers than is recognized in many jurisdictions.
III. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Probably what is best known about Ohio's Domestic Violence Act is that
it created a criminal offense known as "domestic violence." Actually, there
E.g., Letter from Mahoning County Ct. of C.P., supra note 117; letter from Lt. James L. Mustacchio,
Stark County Sheriff's Office (Feb. 23, 1982) (offender is removed only after the court issues a contempt
warrant).
"'E.g., Letter from R. Twining, Cross Roads Crisis Center, Inc., Lima (Feb. 19, 1982); see Trumbull
County Sheriff's Dept. Inter-Office Communication, Domestic Violence Law (Aug. 14, 1981); Dayton
Police Dep't Gen. Order 2.01-2. VII (revised June 1982); cf. Dayton Police Dep't Admin. Memo. No.
0005 (Jan. 17, 1983) (responding to reports that officers were not enforcing Domestic Violence Protection
Orders, the memorandum emphasizes that enforcement, including removal of the suspect when that is
provided in the order, is mandatory).
'Trumbull County Sheriff's Dept. Inter-Office Communication, supra note 132 ("if the protection order
prohibits entrance onto the property, the officer may file a charge of Criminal Trespassing." Id.); Dayton
Police Dept., supra note 132 (while the policy emphasizes that "police officers are not to arrest based
only on a violation of a court order," an overt act of resistance may result in arrest for obstructing official
business. Furthermore, officers are instructed to advise the suspect that his return onto the property will
result in his arrest for disorderly conduct or criminal trespass. Id.).
"'Letter from Ross County Sheriff's Dept. (Feb. 20, 1982); cf. Dayton Police Dept., supra note 132 at
VII C. (Police officers are instructed to remove the suspect from the property "when the . . . terms of
a Court Order include removal of the suspect from the complainant's property." Id.).
"'Letter from Sgt. Jeff Perrin, Sandusky County Sheriff's Dept. (Feb. 8, 1982).
"6OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.3 1(F)(3) (Page Supp. 1982) (emphasis added); accord, Ohio Attorney
General Information Opinion to Ohio Assn. of Police Chiefs, at 4 (May 8, 1982).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(F)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'Letter from Someplace Safe, Inc., Warren (Feb. 23, 1982).
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is little new about the substantive offense described in Section 2919.25. The
elements are identical to the elements of simple assault, also a first degree
misdemeanor,' 39 except that the crime of domestic violence is limited to assaults
between "family or household members."
There is one substantive addition - that a second offense of domestic
violence is a fourth degree felony." ' But the main reason that the legislature
specifically defined a crime of domestic violence was to provide a vehicle for
provisions regarding warrantless arrests and temporary protection orders in
domestic disputes. 4 ' Related provisions mandate that certain information be
provided by law officers on all domestic calls, "42 and that training in handling
domestic disputes be given all new officers."13
A. Police Response
1. Arrest
A frequent complaint by battered women has been the reluctance of police
to arrest the batterer. Previously, Ohio law required law officers to arrest im-
mediately when they observed a crime being committed,1"' but wife batterers
commonly stop their assault when police arrive. "4 Officers were authorized
to arrest without a warrant when there were reasonable grounds to believe that
an offense of violence had been committed outside their presence,"16 but police
had been unwilling to use this authority in domestic situations. Probable cause
is difficult to determine because there are often no uninvolved witnesses, bruises
may not appear immediately, and injuries may be in places which the victim
is reluctant to display.' 47 Officers have feared liability for false arrest if the
complaining witness decides not to carry through with prosecution." 4 The
Domestic Violence Act protects arresting officers by providing that reasonable
ground to believe that a person committed domestic violence exists when the
victim executes a written statement alleging that offense. '"
' "See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Page 1982). Early versions of the Act in the Senate also included a
lesser offense of Domestic Menacing, essentially the offense of menacing, when it occurred between family
or household members. Sub. H.B. 835 as introduced in S. Judiciary Comm. at 8. Regardless of the Act,
menacing, as well as felony assault offenses, remain applicable to domestic situations as well as between
strangers.
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(C) (Page 1982). An assault upon a stranger is deemed a felony only
if the substantive elements are more severe. Id. § 2903.12 (aggravated assault), and § 2903.11 (felonious
assault).
"'Hartley interview, supra note 8.
1'1OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(J) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 109.73; 109.77 (Page Supp. 1982).
"'sOHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A) (Page 1982).
See Gelles, No Place to God, In BA'rERED WOMEN 46, 55-56 (M Roy ed. 1977).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Page 1982) (prior to amendment by H. B. 835).
"'G. Avery, Law Director, Univ. Heights, Ohio, Legal Opinion for the University Heights Police (Mar.
5, 1979).
49TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 17.
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Use of the victim statement probably has increased the willingness to arrest
in some jurisdictions. Several agencies indicated that if the responding officer
determines that the offense of domestic violence has occurred, an arrest will
be made upon execution of a victim statement.'5I In form, this is a limitation
not imposed with other offenses. If an officer independently determines that
there is probable cause to believe any violent offense was committed, that in
itself is enough for an arrest. However, use of the victim statement probably
results in some arrests which previously would not have been made.
On the other hand, some victim advocates report that, despite this statute,
law officers seem particularly reluctant to arrest in cases of domestic violence.' 5'
Some victim advocates observe that police will arrest a wife beater only if the
batterer continues the abuse in an officer's presence or is belligerent to the
officer.'52 (In many of these cases there is a crime committed in the officer's
presence, which triggers a duty to arrest under Ohio's arrest-power statute,
regardless of the amendment enacted by the Domestic Violence Act.) Some
law officers seem especially reluctant to arrest when there have been repeated
calls to the same household, although studies show that repeated episodes of
domestic violence are likely to become increasingly severe. '53
Some jurisdictions apparently take the victim statement procedure as an
invitation to handle domestic violence cases as individual complaints, rather
than complaints which are filed by the police once probable cause is
established.' 5, This puts an onus on the victim which is not so readily imposed
on victims of other crimes. Sometimes a deposit of $15 or $20 is required for
these complaints, which can be prohibitive to many victims in art emergency
situation.' 55 Instead of immediate arrest, some departments routinely advise
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(A) (Page 1982). Senate sponsors proposed a stronger provision which
would impose a duty to arrest when probable cause is established by a signed victim statement, but this
was dropped on the Senate floor. S.B. 514 at 2; Sub. H. B. 835 introduced in Senate Judiciary Comm.
at 9. Cf. Lerman, Survey, supra note 4 at 274 (five states impose a duty to arrest upon probable cause
of spouse or family abuse).
"I'E.g., Letter from Jeff Perrin, Sandusky County Sheriff's Dept., supra note 135; Lake County Sheriff's
Dept., Guidelines for Domestic Violence Complaints 1, 2 (Mar. 1979).
"'Battered women shelters, infra at Appendix; cf. Dayton Police Dept. Gen. Order, 2.01-1 (rev. June
1982); "[i]n general, it is advisable to avoid arrest; however, there are situations when arrest is the only
reasonable alternative for police officers; a. Felonies . . . ; b. Misdemeanors occurring in the officer's
presence; c. Misdemeanor, Domestic Violence, and the complainant has visible signs of injury." Id. at
III B. 4.
"'Police Foundation, Domestic Violence and the Police: Studies in Detroit and Kansas City (1977), cited
in TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 13.
"'Several law enforcement agencies implied that a domestic violence arrest would be made only with a
signed victim statement. Some even require the victim to sign a waiver if she chooses not to insist upon
arrest. Lake County Sheriff's Dept., supra note 151, at 2. But cf. Ross County Sheriff, supra note 134:
"we file the criminal complaint in most cases, as opposed to private complaints." Id.
"'Letters from Youngstown Police Dept. (Feb. 10, 1982) and Athens County Sheriff's Dept. (Feb. 12,
1982); cf. interview with I. Meltzer, WomanShelter, Inc., Ravenna (April 30, 1982) (in 1981, two police
departments in Portage County required a $15 deposit for domestic violence complaints, but other
departments in the county said that this policy, applicable to other misdemeanors, did not apply to domestic
violence).
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domestic violence complainants to go to the prosecutor's office the next week-
day morning to file charges, or issue a "summons in lieu of arrest," which
merely directs the alleged abuser to appear at the next court session. '6
Reluctance to arrest at the scene can be a serious problem because it leaves
the victim exposed to the possibility of further abuse after the police leave and
indicates to the offender that his conduct is not a serious matter. In fact, a
recent study of police tactics concludes that arrest is the most effective way
for police to prevent repeated acts of violence in the home.'"
From the viewpoint of the police, the difficulty may be partly due to a
lack of fit between the goal of immediate protection from abuse and their role
as enforcers of the law. When the victim later asks to have a charge dismissed,
arrest can be seen as an abuse of process and a clog in the court system; yet
the coercive power of police may be the only way to stop the violence and remove
the offender from the household. This perceived incongruity would be alleviated
if the victim had a civil protection order which allows police to remove the
violator from the premises and if police recognize their authority to do so. 's
But civil protection orders are not available on an emergency basis, 59 and many
law enforcement agencies do not exercise their authority to directly enforce
them. 60 Moreover, it is overly narrow to limit law officers to situations likely
to result in successful prosecution. In fact, police response in most contexts
is influenced by various factors other than the potential for prosecution. I6 I The
basic function of law officers is to protect the public. When there is probable
cause to arrest, officers have a responsibility to act without regard to whether
they believe the victim will later cooperate with prosecution.
2. Duty to Inform Victims
Whether or not an arrest is appropriate or desired by the victim, the
Domestic Violence Act mandates that "[a]ny law enforcement agency that in-
vestigates a domestic dispute shall provide information to the family or
household members involved" regarding the civil domestic violence protection
order as well as the temporary protection order which is available when a
'ILetter from Sgt. Jackie Evans, Columbus Police Dept. (Feb. 12, 1982) ("[ojur prosecutors prefer that
we refer the parties to them. If an officer deems it necessary, a probable cause arrest is made."); accord,
Battered women shelters, infra, at Appendix; cf. Akron Police Dept. Dom. Violence Procedure P-79-011
(March 22, 1989) (a "summons in lieu of arrest" directs the alleged offender to appear at the next court
session. Id. at 3).
"'Akron Beacon Journal, April 8, 1983, at BI, col. 1, reporting on a study by the Police Foundation in
which Minneapolis police officers used three tactics selected at random to handle "moderate" domestic
violence cases, defined as simple assaults that did not cause severe or life threatening injuries. The tactics
were arrest, advice or mediation, and ordering the suspect to leave for eight hours. The suspects were
then followed through police reports for six months to see if the violence was repeated. Only ten percent
of those arrested generated a new official report of domestic violence, compared with sixteen percent of
those given advice or mediation and twenty-two percent of those ordered out of the house for eight hours.
"'See supra notes 91-97, 129-139 and accompanying text.
"'See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
6W. LAFAVE, ARREST, 105-52, 437-89 (1965).
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criminal complaint is filed.' 62 This should put victims in a better position to
determine whether they want an arrest, with the knowledge that there is a civil
alternative as well as the knowledge that if they press charges they can get some
protection from retaliation while the charge is pending. Even when arrest is
not an option because the facts of the incident do not amount to domestic
violence under the criminal statute, the facts may be sufficient to invoke the
civil remedy. 163
The statute does not prescribe any form to be used in fulfilling the duty
to inform victims. Many law enforcement agencies have adopted fliers or cards
to be handed to the victim. 64 In some cases this information is printed at the
top of the form used for the victim's statement.' 65 The problem with the latter
format is that victims who do not make a formal complaint may not be given
the information, while victims who do make a statement may not have a copy
of the information to refer to later, since the victim statement is retained by
the police. Many law enforcement agencies have no written explanation, rely-
ing on their officers to give adequate verbal explanations.' 6 6 Although this is
all that the statute requires, the purposes of the statute are better served where
the information is given in writing as well as verbally. A person is not likely
to remember clearly what was said to her in a stressful situation. While a clear
verbal explanation is probably most helpful for the immediate decision, she
should also be given a written card or leaflet which she can review later, under
more calm circumstances.
Some departments encourage officers to provide information beyond the
minimum required by the statute. Officers may be directed to explain the pro-
cedure for an immediate arrest, the option of a "cooling off" period in which
the abusive person voluntarily leaves the residence for the night, and the right
of the victim to go to the prosecutor later to make a complaint.' 67 They may
"6'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(J) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
16"E.g., Akron Police Dept. Form P.D.-182; Columbus Police Dept. Form U-10.128; Dayton Police Dept.
Form F-657 (Iss. April 1979); Toledo Police Dept. Form 38.7; letter from Ross County Sheriff's Dept.
supra note 134; Stark County Sheriff's Dept., Domestic Violence Remedies (victim is asked to sign an
acknowledgement that she has read and understands the information).
"'E.g., Ashtabula County Sheriff's Dept. form beginning, "[tihere are two means available. ; but
cf. Stark County Sheriff's Dept. (two-page form: information sheet is page one, complaint form is on
page two); the Akron Police Dept. prints information about protection orders at the top of the complaint
form, PD-183, as well as on a handout Victim Referral Form PD-182.
"'Letters from Harold Laubenthal, Dep. Chief of Cleveland Police Dept. (Mar. 4, 1982); Youngstown
Police Dept., supra note 155; William Johnston, Ashtabula County Sheriff (Feb. 22, 1982); Athens County
Sheriff's Dept., supra note 155; Lake County Sheriff's Dept., Guidelines, supra note 151; Sandusky County
Sheriff's Dept., supra note 135; Trumbull County Sheriff's Dept., supra note 132; but cf. letter from
Loran Alexander, Wayne County Sheriff (Feb. 8, 1982) ("[w]e provide a small card with information
pertaining to compensation for victims of crime"). Compensation information may be helpful, but it is
not the information required by the Domestic Violence Act.
"'E.g., Letters from Stark County Sheriff's Dept., supra note 131; Trumbull County Sheriff's Dept.,
supra note 132.
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also refer family and household members to social services such as marriage
or alcoholism counselors, or shelters for victims of domestic violence. '68
On the other hand, some law enforcement agencies apparently have not
recognized that their statutory duty to inform domestic violence victims about
both civil and criminal protection orders extends to victims who do not choose
to press charges. ' 69 Whatever the official position, victim advocates report that
compliance is spotty.' 7
Problems can result from noncompliance or misuse of the information
requirement. When the information is simply not provided, victims are denied
the opportunity to make an informed decision. In some cases, the informa-
tion mandate is misused to discourage action by victims: police offer to take
complaints from both parties and threaten to take the children to the county
home. ' 7' Although it may often be true that both parties have engaged in violence
which comes within the definition of the criminal offense, self-defense is a com-
plete defense to a criminal charge. '" When one spouse is clearly the aggressor
police should exercise their discretion not to arrest a spouse who fights back.
On the other hand, the inquiry should not end with a determination of who
struck the first blow. In a case where the wife was the first to physically strike
the other, a husband who responded with more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend himself was not without blame under the law.' 73 There
may be cases when both parties are equally abusive, but law officers should
be careful to avoid turning a statute which was intended to put social sanc-
tions on domestic violence and to provide relief for victims into another tool
to discourage victims from seeking help.
A judge complained shortly after the Act went into effect that the man-
date to inform persons about legal options under the Act in all domestic disputes
had resulted "in reports being read and signed on the scene oftimes in haste.'" '"
It does seem likely that more complaints would be filed when more victims
are told that they have that option. The fact that arrest is the only way to
forcefully remove the offender may result in requests for arrest in cases where
the victim does not want to follow through with criminal prosecution. But in-
"'Ashtabula County Sheriff, supra note 166; Stark County Sheriff's Dept., supra note 131; Akron Police
Dept. Procedure P-79-011 at 2-3 (March 22, 1979); Dayton Police Dept. Gen. Order 2.01-2. at Ill B.2.
(rev. June 1982).
"6'See Dayton Police Dept. Gen. Order, supra note 168, at IV and V (use of information).
'"Letters from battered women's shelters, infra, at Appendix.
17"Id.
" State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St. 2d 15, 20-21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 199-200 (1978).
"'State v. Coy, No. 58-CA-80, Slip. Op. at 5 (Fairfield County Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1981) (available in
Ohio Dec. on Fiche 81-5-5d).
"Crane, The Domestic Violence Act - Amended Sub. House Bill #835, 2 CUYAHOGA CouNTY BAR Assoc.
NEWSLETTER 1, 4 (July 1979).
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formation about the alternative of a civil protection order ought to mitigate
the number of such requests, at least when civil orders are easily obtained and
readily enforced, and the offender agrees to a separation until the order can
be obtained.
3. Officer Training
The Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic Violence emphasized that
effective police response is a crucial part of a social policy on domestic violence.
"Police officers are frequently the first persons called to intervene in a mate
abuse situation ...[h]owever, it is generally recognized that present police
responses are ineffectual." 175 The Task Force cited studies which indicate that
effective law officer response to relatively minor domestic disturbances could
prevent later incidents of aggravated assault and homicide.'76 The Task Force
also noted that domestic calls are a major source of officer injury and homicide,
but that officers can enhance their own safety by the manner in which they
handle a disturbance.1
77
In response to this concern, the Domestic Violence Act provides that fif-
teen hours of training in the handling of domestic disputes must be included
in the training provided to all new law officers. Advanced in-service training
is encouraged but not required.' 78
The practical effect of these provisions hinges upon two factors: how many
officers actually receive specialized training in handling domestic disputes, and
the nature of the training. Since the training is mandated only for new officers,
the extent of the training depends in part on how many new officers have been
appointed since the Domestic Violence Act went into effect in March, 1979.
Reports in early 1982 varied from between about one-fifth new officers in Col-
umbus and Cleveland to nearly the entire force in some small sheriff's depart-
ments. The amount of in-service training provided to experienced officers ranged
from none in some departments to extensive training for all officers in others. 179
The nature of the training varies since each training school may develop
its own program, but many use the training program developed by the Ohio
Peace Officer Training Academy (OPOTA). 18 0 This program emphasizes crisis
'TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 13.
6Id.
1'7Id
'"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.73(A)(4); (5); (6) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'Letters from Cleveland Police Dept., Columbus Police Dept., Youngstown Police Dept., supra notes
155, 156, 164; Ashtabula County Sheriff's Dept., Athens County Sheriff's Dept., Ross County Sheriff's
Dept., Trumbull County Sheriff's Dept., Wayne County Sheriff's Dept., supra notes 132, 134, 154, 155,
164, 165, 166.
Interview with Ronald Black, instructor, Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy (Feb. 18, 1982); see
Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE TRAINING PROGRAM, "Course Outline" and
"Lesson Plan" (1979) [hereinafter cited as OPOTA].
[Vol. 16:4
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 4, Art. 7
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss4/7
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
intervention skills. The lesson plan stresses that a major part of police work
involves "helping the public..., not policing criminal activity,'"I8 and empha-
sizes the use of mediation and referral for domestic disputes. This appears to
be helpful in expanding the range of skills available to officers and in counterac-
ting the view that there is nothing a law officer can do unless a formal com-
plaint is filed.' 82
However, the OPOTA lesson plan also perpetuates misconceptions which
can prevent effective handling of woman abuse. The material on mediation
does not discuss the limitations of this technique where one party wields coer-
cive power over the other.' 83 The guidelines for dealing with spouse abuse com-
ment, "both persons are usually to blame." 8 This attitude fails to recognize
the difference beteween a mere quarrel and the use of violence or intimida-
tion, or to distinguish between the apparent source of disagreement and the
nature of the conduct.' 8 It reinforces the tendency of both aggressor and victim
to blame the victim for domestic violence.'8 6 Although arrest may be inap-
propriate in many domestic disputes to which police are called, the OPOTA
program goes too far in stressing that arrest is a last resort: "when all else fails
... to restore order," or only "if one party insists on filing a complaint."' 87
There is no recognition that where violence or intimidation has occurred, a
crime has been committed, or any discussion of why arrest and prosecution
may in some cases be appropriate.' 88
This emphasis on mediation is typical of police departments throughout
the United States which have responded to criticism of official neglect of wife
abuse by training officers in conflict management. However, the psychologists
who developed the pioneer program for police crisis intervention training never
intended this to be the exclusive response. They "assumed that situations in-
volving violence and assault exceeded the limits of 'crisis intervention' and that
the police powers of force and arrest would be invoked. Unfortunately, this
was not to happen." '89 While mediation skills seem to be an important addi-
tion to police training, the training should also address the appropriateness
of traditional police powers in domestic conflicts involving violence.19
"'OPOTA, supra note 180, at L.P.-3.
"'E.g., Cleveland Police Dept., supra note 166.
"'See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
"OPOTA, supra note 180 at outline-5.
'L. WALKER observes, "[wihen batterers describe acute battering incidents, they concentrate on justifying
their behavior. Often they recite a great many petty annoyances .... The trigger for moving into phase
two [the acute battering incident] is rarely the battered woman's behavior; rather, it is usually an external
event or the internal state of the man." L. WALKER. supra note 41, at 53.
'16See Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 16.
"OPOTA, supra note 180, at L.P.-9.
"'See infra notes 228-253 and accompanying text, and supra note 157.
"N. Loving, Responding to Spouse Abuse & Wife Beating: A Guide for Police, 35-36 (Police Executive
Research Forum, 1909 K Street N.W., Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20006) (1980).
"'See supra note 157.
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B. Temporary Protection Order
1. Statutory Provisions
When a complaint of domestic violence is filed, Section 2919.26 provides
for a temporary protection order (TPO) "designed to ensure the safety and
protection of the complainant or family or household members.
Although pretrial conditions on release are authorized in some cases by Criminal
Rule 46, this statutory TPO is unique to this criminal charge. It was provided
because of the special need for interim protection of a victim of domestic
violence. 192
The statute prescribes a form for a Motion for Temporary Protection Order
which may be filed by the complainant or by the arresting officer in an emer-
gency when the complainant is unable to file. 193 A hearing is to be held as soon
as possible but not later than twenty-four hours after the motion is filed. 
94
The person who requested the TPO must appear at the hearing. '9I As an alter-
native, the court may issue a TPO "upon its own motion," when a complaint
is filed. When this is done, a hearing must be held within twenty-four hours
to review the order.'
96
In either case, the order is to be based upon a finding "that the safety
and protection of the complainant or the family or household member... may
be impaired by the continued presence of the alleged offender." The order
should contain terms designed to ensure the safety of the family or household
member, "including a requirement that the alleged offender refrain from enter-
ing the residence, school, business, or place of employment of the com-
plainant or family or household member." No other terms are explicitly
authorized.197
This TPO is "a pretrial condition of release" in addition to bail. 98 A 1981
amendment makes it clear that the TPO procedure does not override the bail
guidelines set out in Criminal Rule 46. A defendant may not be held in custody
pending a hearing on a motion for a temporary protection order if he meets
the criteria in the rule and executes any bail or bond required. 99 However,
"'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(B) (Page 1982).
' TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 17; Hartley interview, supra note 28.
"'OaIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(A); (B) (Page 1982). H.B. 920 amended this section to make it clear
that officers are not obligated to file the motion themselves, nor to provide the forms, which are to be
provided by the clerk of court.
"'Id. § 2919.26(C). This has not required courts to open on weekends because Criminal Rule 45(A) provides
that Saturdays, Sundays and holidays are excluded in computing time periods of less than seven days.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 45(A) (Page 1982). See, Attorney General, supra note 136, at 2.
1"'Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Page 1982).
"'Id. § 2919.26(D). Jurisdiction to issue and enforce temporary protection orders under § 2919.26 is expressly
granted to municipal and county courts. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1901.18(I), 1901.19(G); 1902.02(I) (Page
1982).
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C); (D)(3) (Page 1982).
"'Id. § 2919.26(E)(1).
"'Id. § 2919.26(F).
[Vol. 16:4
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it should be noted that the rule itself permits a defendant to be held without
bail until a hearing before a judge if there is evidence that his release may pose
a danger to others."'0
The TPO is effective only until the criminal proceeding is disposed of or
until a civil protection order or consent agreement is issued based upon the
same incident. ," ' It is not admissible as evidence that the defendant committed
the alleged offense.2"2
2. Legal Issues
This aspect of the Domestic Violence Act was greeted with protests from
judges and lawyers concerned about the apparent grant of equity powers to
the municipal or county court and about possible infringement of defendants'
rights.
Many lawyers, judges and prosecutors contended that the effect of this
section would be to require municipal and county courts to adjudicate household
disputes, an unnecessary and inappropriate duplication of the jurisdiction of
the court of common pleas. 20 3 However, in contrast to the broad scope of the
civil protection order provided in Section 3113.31, the criminal temporary pro-
tection order is narrowly tailored to promote criminal prosecution by protec-
ting the complaining witness while the case is pending. Section 2919.26 reflects
a recognition by the legislature that when the victim and alleged offender are
members of the same household, the continued presence of the alleged offender
while the case is pending is likely to be a threat to the safety of the victim as
well as a significant pressure against prosecution. While the civil protection
order may invoke broad equity powers "to bring about a cessation of
violence," 2 ' the criminal protection order is more narrowly directed "to ensure
the safety and protection of the complainant or family or household member."2 5
The only term expressly authorized by Section 2919.26 is an order to stay away.
The municipal court is given no new power by this section. Criminal Rule 46
already allowed the court to "[p]lace restrictions on the travel, association or
place of abode of the person during the period of release.120 6 As one court
noted, a domestic violence TPO differs from a pretrial condition of release
'"OHIo R. CRIM. P. 46(D)(3) (Page 1982); see Attorney General, supra note 136.
2°'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(E)(2) (Page 1982).
202Id. § 2919.26(E)(3).
"'Crane, supra note 174, at 3; letter from Nicholas J. Luca, prosecutor for Newton Falls Mun. Ct., to
Sheriff Richard A. Jakmas of Trumbul County (Oct. 16, 1980).
2'OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(E)(1) (Page Supp. 1982).
"'1OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(C) (Page 1982).
'*'OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46(C)(2); (D)(3); accord, State v. Heyl, No. C79 CRB 7120 (Hamilton County Mun.
Ct. 1979), discussed in Woods, Challenges to Legislation Enacted on Behalf of Battered Women, 14
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 426, 427 (1980) (pleadings available from National Clearinghouse for Legal Services,
Inc., 500 N. Michigan, Suite 1940, Chicago, I11. 60611).
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pursuant to Rule 46 only in purpose. 207 To deal with such issues as family sup-
port or visitation, a person must petition the court of common pleas. A criminal
protection order yield to a subsequent civil protection order arising out of the
same activities. °8
A further objection was that the TPO amounted to a denial of the right
to bail under Criminal Rule 46 and the state constitution. 29 This concern was
especially acute in many jurisdictions where the initial interpretation of the
statute was that domestic violence defendants must be held without bond until
the hearing on the motion for a temporary protection order, contrary to the
usual procedure for misdemeanor defendants under Rule 46, which allows pre-
arraignment release by the clerk of court upon execution of an unsecured bond
specified in a schedule determined by the court.2"' This interpretation was
precluded by the language added in 1981,211 but the argument remains that
the right to bail is infringed upon by the imposition of other conditions of pretrial
release. This issue was argued in State v. Heyl, an unreported case in Hamilton
County.112 In that case, the prosecutor and amicus curiae argued that the right
to bail did not preclude reasonable conditions of release. Criminal Rule 46(D)(3)
allows the clerk to refuse pre-arraignment release if the defendant's "physical,
mental or emotional condition appears to be such that he may pose a danger
to himself or others if released immediately." At a subsequent hearing, the
judge must determine conditions of release under Rule 46(C), which may in-
clude "restrictions on the travel, association or place of abode of the person
during the period of release." 2 ' 3 The TPO procedure is within these guidelines.
The defendant in Heyl also argued that the temporary protection order
amounted to an imposition of criminal penalties without requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. The prosecution and amicus curiae responded that this
standard of proof was required only for a trial on the ultimate issue of guilt,
and noted that the fact that a TPO was issued was not admissible in a trial
on the merits.21" The defendant also contended that exclusion from his residence
"'State v. Dawson, No. 79 AP-565 (Franklin County Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1979) (holding that a TPO is
not a final appealable order). This is not contradicted by another court's characterization of § 2919.26
as "basically civil in nature," because the latter involved a comparison of § 2919.26 with § 2919.25, finding
that a TPO did not constitute a ruling on the merits of the criminal charge. State v. Roberts, No.'s 875
and 881 (Medina County Ct. App. July 25, 1979).
...OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(E)(2) (Page 1982).
'"OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9.
"'°E.g., The Franklin County Public Defender, Memo Re: Application of the Domestic Violence Law
in the Franklin County Municipal Court (July 27, 1979); this argument was raised and rejected in Roberts.
Without discussion, the court held that even if bail was denied during the weekend incarceration, the
defendant was not entitled to dismissal. State v. Roberts, No.'s 875 and 881 (Medina County Ct. App.
July 25, 1979).
"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(F) (Page 1982).
"'State v. Heyl, No. C79 CRB 7120 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct. 1979).
"'OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46 (Page 1982).
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(E)(3) (Page 1982). Cf. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C.
App. en banc 1981) (upholding a statute authorizing preventive detention prior to trial).
[Vol. 16:4
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was a deprivation of property without due process. The procedure, however,
meets the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court for pre-judgment
limitation on property.2 ' The court rejected these challenges and ruled in favor
of the prosecution.
3. Practice
Issuance of a temporary protection order is discretionary, and the prac-
tice varies from county to county. Some courts rarely issue TPO's ' 6 while others
do so in almost every case. :"7 Although the statute allows the court to issue
a protection order "upon its own motion" at the time a complaint is filed,"'8
the usual practice is to hold a TPO hearing along with the arraignment, usually
the morning after the arrest."1 9
Initially, many jurisdictions understood the statute to require that a
domestic violence defendant be held in custody until the protection order
hearing. ' This would enforce a cooling-off period and ensure the safety of
the household until a protection order could be issued. An amendment added
with the enactment of H.B. 920 in 1981 makes it clear that a domestic violence
defendant cannot be held if he meets the criteria for bail under Criminal Rule
46 and posts the bond required. "2 ' However, many jurisdictions are able to
hold most domestic violence defendants overnight by setting the bond schedule
for domestic violence at the highest permissible level. 2 ' Furthermore, even defen-
dants who are able to post bond may be held pursuant to Rule 46(D), which
allows the clerk to refuse to release a defendant whose "physical, mental or
emotional condition appears to be such that he may pose a danger to himself
or others if released immediately." 2 3 It is reasonable to expect that such a danger
would be present in most domestic violence cases, where going home after book-
ing means returning to the scene of the conflict. Law officers should alert the
clerk to this danger.2 2 4
"'Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"'E.g., Letters, from Stark County Prosecutor (Feb. 8, 1982); and several battered women's projects,
infra, at Appendix.
'"E.g., Letters from Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 19, Sandusky County Prosecutor (Feb. 5, 1982), and
battered women's shelders, infra, at Appendix.
2 1
'OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(D) (Page 1982).
2
'E.g., Letters from Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 19, Sandusky County Prosecutor, supra note 217,
John Bender, J., Crawford County Mun. Ct. (March 11, 1982), several battered women's shelters, infra,
at Appendix.
"'E.g., Franklin County Public Defender, supra note 209.
"'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(F) (Page 1982).
"'.E.g., Bender, J., supra note 219 (bond schedule of $500.00 cash or surety usually results in offender
remaining in custody until next business day).
...OHIo R. CRIM. P. 46 (D)(3) (Page 1982).
".Accord, Lake County Sheriff, Guidelines, supra note 151, at 2; Sandusky County Sheriff, supra note 135.
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An alternative, to provide some protection to the family when the defen-
dant is to be released prior to the arraignment and protection order hearing,
is for a judge to issue a temporary protection order ex parte, as permitted by
Section 2919.26(D), at the same time the clerk determines what bond applies. 25
After court hours, the clerk could obtain the order by phoning the administrative
judge, which is similar to the practice of many clerks for setting bond in felony
cases. The order would be reviewed at the arraignment, as required by the
statute.226 The exparte procedure can also be used to obtain a temporary pro-
tection order immediately when a charge is filed at the prosecutor's office after
the incident.227
A protection order has little value if it is not effectively enforced. The
statutory provisions for enforcement of the criminal protection order are iden-
tical to those for the civil protection order, 228 and the practical and legal pro-
blems are the same.229
C. Prosecution
Prosecuting attorneys play a central role in effectuating the policy em-
bodied in Section 2919.25, a policy which states that wife beating is a matter
of community concern and deserves criminal sanctions. Many prosecutors are
reluctant to go forward with domestic violence cases because of a high rate
of non-cooperation by complaining witnesses. However, a study of spouse abuse
prosecution programs by Lisa Lerman of the Center for Women Policy Studies
found that both victim cooperation and conviction rates can be significantly
increased when prosecutors adopt appropriate practices.23 Lerman found that
two principles underlie successful spouse abuse prosecution: first, it should be
made clear that domestic violence is a crime against the state, and that the pro-
secutor, not the victim, is responsible for enforcing the law; second, the prose-
cutor should be aware of the concerns of the victim and set goals for prosecu-
tion which correspond to these concerns.
It might appear obvious that the state, rather than the victim, is primarily
responsible for the prosecution of domestic violence. This is the basic difference
between a criminal case and a civil dispute. Many prosecutors, however, do
not acknowledge this in practice. At the extreme is one Ohio prosecutor who
simply denies that domestic violence is a criminal offense. He stated that he
would not handle these cases because the municipal court "does not have
domestic relations jurisdiction."231 Prosecutors in other jurisdictions use practices
"'E.g., Franklin County Public Defender, supra note 210, at 4.
"6OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(D)(2) (Page 1982).
2 2 Some battered women's shelters reported this practice, infra, Appendix.
...OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(G) (Page 1982). Language expressly permitting immediate enforcement
by removal was omitted from § 2919.26 in H.B. 835, but was inserted by H.B. 920.
"'See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
23 Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 5.
" N. Luca, supra note 203.
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which may reinforce a feeling that the complaining victim is personally respon-
sible for the criminal prosecution. Many jurisdictions treat all domestic violence
cases as individual complaints, requiring that the victim rather than the law
officer or prosecutor sign the complaint, creating the impression that it is up
to the victim to decide whether the case will proceed.132 Not only do such prac-
tices encourage the view that wife beating is a personal matter - not a public
concern like "real" crimes - they also reinforce the pressure on the victim
to seek a dismissal.
In contrast, some Ohio prosecutors take a firm position that the state is
the plaintiff in a criminal prosecution of domestic violence, as evidenced by
their refusal to drop the charge merely at the request of the complaining
witness.213 The Court of Appeals of Montgomery County affirmed this view
in Dayton v. Thomas, 23 finding that the trial court had no discretion to dismiss
a case at the insistence of the complaining witness over the objection of the
prosecuting attorney: the court would not deny the state its day in court. Some
prosecutors will even compel the victim to appear in court.3 The Perrysburg
Municipal Court jailed a wife for contempt of court when she refused to testify
at trial on a domestic violence charge that she had initiated against her hus-
band. The charge was upheld on appeal.236 A further practice followed with
success by one of the programs studied by Lerman was to proceed with pro-
secution even if the victim fails to appear.2 37 On the other hand, the prosecutor
should take the concerns of the victim into consideration. This is not to say
that prosecutors should become family counselors and domestic relations
lawyers, but some awareness of the pressures on battered women, and atten-
tion to the reasons why they bring criminal charges, is important to encourage
victim cooperation.
Prosecutors around the United States have found that protection orders
are crucial to safeguard complainants from retaliation and further abuse while
the charge is pending.23 Ohio prosecutors are fortunate that specific authoriza-
tion for such orders is present in the Domestic Violence Act. They should en-
courage their courts to exercise this authority, not merely as a service to vic-
"'E.g., Bender, J., Crawford County Mun. Ct., supra note 219 (if complainant who signed the victim
statement under § 2935.03(A) later refuses to sign the actual complaint, neither the law officer nor prosecutor
will file the charge in some cases); see supra note 154.
2 E.g., Stark County Prosecutor, supra note 216.
1"17 OHIo Op. 3d 255 (Montgomery County Ct. App. 1980).
S'E.g., Stark County Prosecutor, supra note 216.
"'State v. Karnes, No. WD-81-24 (Wood County Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1981) (available on Ohio App. on
Fiche 81-8-6d).
"'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 7. "In 45 percent of the domestic cases charged by the Seattle[Washington] City Attorney during a two-year period from 1978 to 1980, the victim did not appear in
court on the date of the trial. Rather than requesting dismissal, the prosecution proceeded without her.
In 143 out of 420 cases (34 percent) in which this approach was taken during the two-year period, convictions
were obtained based on the testimony of a police officer, another eyewitness, or on photographs of injuries
inflicted." Id.
" Id. at 8.
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tims or a way to bypass domestic relations court but as an essential part of
a policy to encourage witness cooperation.
A lack of information about the criminal process is a significant factor
in discouraging victim participation.239 Often, the complaining witness does
not even see a prosecutor until the pretrial, which may be several weeks after
the arrest and arraignment. Prosecutors should endeavor to keep victims in-
formed at each step of the procedure. On the other hand, victim advocates
observe that some prosecutors use this informational role to discourage pro-
secution by stressing that the criminal process entails great difficulties and
minimal results. 24 0 Prosecutors need to recognize that prosecution can be worth-
while to the victim, as well as to deter domestic violence.
Both victims and prosecutors benefit when prosecutors try to understand
what battered women want from the criminal justice system, and adjust their
strategies accordingly.2"' A battered woman with young children and no means
of support may be reluctant to proceed with prosecution if she believes that
it will result in a stiff fine or incarceration. A woman who wants to continue
to have a relationship with the defendant, but to end the abuse, may want to
impress upon the defendant that his conduct is criminal and could result in
a stiff penalty. Probably many potential dismissals could be turned into con-
victions if complainants were informed about possible sentencing treatments.4 2
The prosecutors studied by Lerman often seek mandatory counseling in
lieu of a fine or incarceration. 4 3 Ohio's Domestic Violence Act specifically
provides that upon conviction of domestic violence,"[t]he court may suspend
execution of the sentence and place the offender on probation conditioned upon
the participation of the offender, to the satisfaction of the court, in a program
of clinically appropriate psychiatric or psychological treatment.244 This disposi-
tion would meet the concerns of complainants who want their abusive part-
ners to work to improve their behavior. It should also promote the social goal
of reducing future violence - if prosecutors and courts enforce partitipation
and see that the type of counseling ordered is appropriate to the situation.
243
"'Id. at 8; communications from victim advocates. Letters from battered women's shelters, infra, at
Appendix.
1'*Communications from victim advocates. Letters from battered women's shelters, infra, at Appendix.
1'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 7.
Z2Communications from most victim advocates and prosecutors show that a typical disposition for a first
conviction of domestic violence is a fine of $50.00 to $100.00 and 30 days in jail, with most or all jail
time suspended, in contrast to the maximum sentence of $1000.00 and six months imprisonment. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.21 (Page 1982). Prosecutors state that domestic violence sentences are equivalent
to sentences for assault, the comparable crime between strangers. Letters from prosecutors in Ashtabula
County, Sandusky County, Stark County and Toledo, supra notes 19, 23, 216, and 217.
"'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 11-12.
2
"OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.16 (Page 1982).
"'see supra note 83 and accompanying text; Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 11-12.
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However, this option is seldom used in Ohio courts, and when imposed, there
is often no follow-up to ensure the participation of the offender. 46
It is also helpful for prosecutors to recognize the needs of battered women
which go beyond the results available through criminal prosecution. In addi-
tion to informing complainants about what can and what cannot be accomplish-
ed through the criminal process, prosecutors should provide information about
civil remedies and social services. Again, this is not only a service to the vic-
tim; such referrals may be critical to deal with problems which can interfere
with her ability or willingness to cooperate with prosecutor. 47 Prosecutors should
avoid making a practice of using referral to social services and civil remedies
as a way to divert battered women from prosecution. Referral may be appro-
priate in some cases, as when there is insufficient evidence to prosecute.
However, many cases may be diverted from prosecution where, from the vic-
tim's point of view, the authoritative disapproval expressed by a conviction
could be an important complement to civil remedies or counseling. 48 From
the viewpoint of the community, consistent diversion of domestic violence cases
to social services and to private remedies communicates the message that
domestic violence is a private matter, not a serious crime. A similar issue arises
in cities where many domestic violence cases are diverted to mediation
programs. 49 While mediation may be appropriate for neighborhood disputes,
in cases of wife abuse, mediation may reinforce the tendency of both abuser
and abused to blame the victim for the violence and fail to tell the abuser that
he is committing a crime. 5' Again, mediation may be an appropriate alter-
native in some cases, but these programs should not be used merely as a device
to reduce the caseload of "minor disputes" without regard to the needs of bat-
tered women, the offenders, and society's interest in the censure of domestic
violence.
Still, a well-planned program of diversion to counseling, with prosecu-
tion deferred, may be effective. The threat of prosecution motivates the offender
to participate in the counseling. Counseling can be initiated immediately after
a battering incident when offenders are most susceptible to treatment. A model
diversion program in Miami, Florida allows offenders to participate if there
has been no prior arrest for a violent crime if both offender and victim agree
2
"6E.g., Letters from battered women's shelters, infra, at Appendix.
'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 8.
24'One victim advocate has observed prosecutors tell women who had begun divorce proceedings, as well
as women who plan to continue the relationship because their partners have agreed to participate in
counseling, that they may as well drop the charges. It is unclear when under this view, prosecution would
be appropriate. Meltzer supra note 155.
2'1This includes Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton and Toledo. Letters from battered women's shelters, infra,
at Appendix.
"'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 16-17. A 1980 evaluation of mediation programs funded by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration shows that their handling of family violence cases was
largely ineffective. Id., citing R. COOKE, et al., NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST: FINAL
EVALUATION REPORT (1980).
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to the offender's participation and if the counselor is confident that the of-
fender is motivated to change.25 It is critical that batterers be carefully supervised
and that prosecution be resumed if a batterer fails to appear for counseling
or violates any other terms of his diversion agreement. Such a program could
be implemented in Ohio under the diversion statute.252
Another variable of prosecution is the willingness of the prosecutor to
accept repeat complaints. It is easy to understand that prosecutors would be
impatient with complaints from people who have previously requested dismissal
of similar charges against the same persons. However, there are circumstances
characteristic of battering relationships which suggest that prosecuting attorneys
should be receptive to repeat complaints. Low self-esteem, belief in the tradi-
tional view of the family, and economic dependence are significant factors that
make it difficult for a battered woman to seek help and to persevere in the
face of procedural obstacles.253 In addition, the burst of violence is typically
followed by kindness and contrition.25 4 But the cycle recurs, and the severity
of the battering incidents typically increases.' Thus, it is important for pro-
secutors to understand that, on one hand, the pressures on a battered woman
to withdraw from prosecution are particularly strong, and on the other hand,
a later complaint is likely to involve a more severe incident. Refusal to pro-
secute a repeat complaint reinforces the battered woman's belief that she is
responsible for her own suffering and that no one else will help her. This belief
may result in severe injury or death to the woman or her abuser. Nevertheless,
some Ohio prosecutors and courts discourage repeat complaints.
256 Others, more
in keeping with the policy of the Domestic Violence Act and the principles of
prosecution discussed above, will accept such complaints, sometimes with a
firm statement that this time the charge will not be dropped.
2
"
D. Repeat Offense as Felony
Where a previous charge has been carried through to a conviction, the
Domestic Violence Act provides that a new complaint involving the same parties
should be treated as a felony of the fourth degree.25 In contrast to the ordi-
nary assault statutes, under which the degree of the charge is based upon the
severity of the physical harm,259 the Domestic Violence Act evidences a legislative
"'Lerman, Prosecution, supra note 83, at 11-15.
...OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.56 (Page 1982).
113L. WALKER, supra note 41, at 26; Battered Women, supra note 146, at 43.
11'L. WALKER, supra note 41, at 49-61.
"'TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 13.
1"6Letters from Licking County Prosecutor, (Feb. 8, 1982), Wm. Wray Bevins, Pike County Prosecutor,
(Feb. 11, 1982) and Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 19.
"'Sandusky County Prosecutor, supra note 217.
".'OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(C) (Page 1982). Potential penalties are six months to five years
imprisonment and up to $2500.00 in fines. Id. § 2929.11.
1'Id. § 2903.11 (felonious assault); § 2903.12 (aggravated assault); § 2903.13 (assault); § 2903.14 (negligent
assault).
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intent that not only is it wrong to beat one's wife, it is more culpable to do
the same thing again. However, this provision is seldom used. This is partly
due to lack of opportunity because of the low rate of convictions in the first
place.260 But there is also some direct resistance by judges and prosecutors to
treating the same substantive conduct as a more severe offense simply because
there is a prior conviction. 6' However, nearly thirty other criminal statutes
require enhanced charges for repeat offenses.262
Indeed, the refusal to support more severe charges appears to comport
with the suggestion of successful family violence prosecution programs that
victims are more willing to cooperate when stiff penalties are not stressed. On
the other hand, that experience may not be applicable to second-time prosecu-
tion. The sheriff of Ross County, where felony domestic violence charges have
been successfully prosecuted, found that the second-offense-felony provision
is a useful deterrent; "[it] adds a bigger more compelling reason for the
perpetrator to resist the use of violence and seek help." '263
E. Comparison of Civil and Criminal Actions
A temporary protection order, or a civil protection order are nearly
equivalent alternatives for victims of domestic violence who wish to prosecute.
They are similar in that a protective order is available through both processes,
but fundamental differences should be recognized. Criminal prosecution infers
that the offender's conduct is socially unacceptable and amounts to a crime
against the state. The provision for a temporary protection order is not an impor-
tation of domestic relations law into the criminal court but a measure to pre-
vent intimidation of a complaining witness. The TPO is tailored to this end
- its terms are limited to basic protection and it is effective only while the
case is pending. In contrast, with a civil protection order, there is no onus of
criminal responsibility. The civil proceeding is tailored to address private
disputes. It is available for a broader range of behavior, and can order a broad
range of relief, including financial support, child custody and counseling, as
well as basic protection. The two types of proceedings under the Domestic
2
"Toledo Prosecutor, supra note 19.
26 E.g., Pike County Prosecutor, supra note 226 (whether a second offense is prosecuted as a felony depends
"upon the severity of the offense." Id.).
'
6 2OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32 (pandering obscenity); § 2907.321 (Pandering); § 2913.02 (theft); §
2913.11 (passing bad checks); § 2913.21 (misuse of credit cards; § 2913.41 (defrauding a livery or hostelry);
§ 2913.51 (receiving stolen property); § 2915.02 (gambling); § 2915.03 (operating a gambling house); §
2915.05 (public gaming); § 2915.05 (cheating); § 2915.06 (corrupting sports); § 2917.21 (telephone
harassment); § 2919.12 (consensual abortion); § 2919.22 (endangering children); § 2923.12 (carrying concealed
weapons); § 2925.03 (trafficking in drugs); § 2925.11 (drug abuse); § 2925.12 (possessing drug abuse
instruments); § 2925.13 (permitting drug abuse); § 2925.21 (theft of drugs); § 2925.22 (deception to obtain
a dangerous drug); § 2925.23 (illegal processihg of drug documents); § 2925.31 (abusing harmful intoxicants);
§ 2925.36 (illegal dispensing of drug samples) (Page 1982). See also, Am. Sub. S. Bill 199 (eff. Jan. 5,
1983) (reclassifying several felonies as aggravated felonies and requiring longer minimum prison terms
for repeat convictions).
"'Letter from Ross County Sheriff, supra note 134.
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Violence Act are complementary options. Used alternatively or together, they
can be significant tools to reduce domestic violence.
IV. STATISTICAL REPORTING
Another concern of the Attorney General's Task Force on Domestic
Violence was the lack of any reporting system which would show the incidence
of domestic violence. These cases are usually not "index crimes" which appear
in the Ohio Uniform Crime Report. Local law enforcement departments might
note "domestic" calls without specifying the crime, or record the crime charged
without specifying the domestic context.164 In response, the Domestic Violence
Act requires every local law enforcement agency to "keep a separate record
of domestic dispute and domestic violence problems" on a form prepared by
the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI).165 The form is
to include the number of domestic problems reported, the relationship of all
persons involved, the action taken by the law enforcement officers, and any
other information that the superintendent of BCI believes is relevant. 66 Local
reports are to be submitted to BCI each month, and BCI is to prepare an annual
statistical report. A sunset provision automatically repeals the reporting pro-
visions in March, 1983 unless specifically reenacted.1
67
After some experimentation in 1979, a form was adopted which records
the total number of domestic calls, action taken by a law officer (including
arrest for domestic violence, arrest for other crimes, referral and no action),
relationship of the victim and complainant to offender in cases where com-
plaints are filed, and also, where there is a complaint, the degree of apparent
injury to the victim (fatal, non-fatal, or none).168 The statistics are limited, of
course, to calls or situations which become known to the police. They do not
include situations that do not enter the criminal justice system, nor do they
include follow-up information such as the number of victims who filed charges
at a later time through the prosecutor.
Although statistically accurate analysis is beyond the scope of this com-
ment, the state-wide totals for 1980 and 1981 reveal some interesting results:
Of all reported victims, about seventy percent were "wives" (which includes
all female "persons living as spouses." 269 Homicide victims were about equally
16'TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 15, 52-54.
'"Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.32 (Page 1980). This duty is imposed upon county, township, city and
village law enforcement agencies. Id.
"6'The original proposal introduced into the House Judiciary Committee included the number of vehicles
and police officers dispatched and the date and-time of each domestic dispute handled by police. Sub.
H.B. 835.
"6'H.B. 835, § 3, Staff Notes to OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.32 (Page 1980).
"'Attorney General William J. Brown, The Ohio Report on Domestic Violence 1980, at 12 [hereinafter
cited as 1980 Report] and Attorney General William J. Brown, The Ohio Report on Domestic Violence
1981 at 12 [hereinafter cited as 1981 Report].
"'11980 Report, supra note 268, at 17 and 1981 Report at 17.
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divided between husbands and wives." ' The numbers of domestic calls were
lowest during the month of February, rose steadily to a peak in June or July,
and declined as the weather cooled. 7 '
In both 1980 and 1981, the proportion of reported calls throughout the
state resulting in arrest averaged thirteen percent. 27 12 Seventy-three percent of
these arrests were made under the Domestic Violence Act.2 7 3 Referral to other
agencies was reported for fifteen percent of the calls in 1980, while "no action"
was reported in seventy-one percent of the calls.274 More calls in 1981 (nine-
teen percent) involved referral. 75
These statistics must be viewed with some reservations. Although the statute
makes the reporting mandatory, there is no penalty for noncompliance. A few
law enforcement agencies have not participated in the Domestic Dispute
Domestic Violence Reporting Program, and some have reported statistics for
less than twelve months of the year. 76
Moreover, it is apparent that many other law enforcement agencies have
not complied with the intent of the law. The 1980 Report found that of the
nine major cities in Ohio, only Dayton was fully complying with the intent
of the reporting requirements. "Some cities are reporting only those calls that
result in an arrest or referral to another agency ... [while] [o]ther cities are
listing domestic dispute calls as disturbances, assaults and other terminology
and not reporting these into the program.277
Dayton reported a total of 11,041 domestic calls in 1980. The next highest
number reported was 2,044 calls (Toledo). Dayton's report indicates 550
domestic calls for every 10,000 inhabitants, compared to four calls per 10,000
residents in Parma and 75 calls per 10,000 residents in Columbus.2 78
Cleveland reported 924 domestic calls in 1980 and 1272 in 1981. Yet in
1979 a week-long tally of calls received by Cleveland dispatchers projected 20,000
family violence calls in the city per year.2 '9 The reports show only 426 calls
"'Id. at 51.
"'Id. at 19.
2721d.
2'Id. at 20.
2741d.
271981 Report, supra note 268, at 20.
271In 1980, statistics were contributed by seventy-eight of the eighty-eight sheriff's offices and 567 of an
unknown number of police departments. 1980 Report, supra note 268, at 9. In 1981, eighty-one sheriff's
offices and 576 police departments contributed domestic reports. 1981 Report, supra note 268, at 9.
1"1980 Report, supra note 268, at 52.
1
7SId. at 53.
1'G. Kilbane, Ohio's Domestic Violence Law: An Analysis, 5 (Cleveland Victim/Witness Service Center,
Dec. 1979).
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in Columbus in 1980 and 2174 in 1981, although a computer printout for a
single quarter of 1977 showed 22,352 cars dispatched for domestic disputes,
or about 89,000 runs in a year. 80 Furthermore, Columbus reported no injuries
in domestic disputes even though fifty arrests were made in 1980 and 211 arrests
were made in 1981.81
If domestic dispute reports were made faithfully, the statistics could pro-
vide useful insight into the nature and extent of domestic violence in Ohio.
Even if the incidence of domestic violence is vastly underreported, the reports
should aid in the comparison of law enforcement agency responses. Obviously
the reporting program puts an additional burden on law enforcement agen-
cies, but Dayton's performance shows that it is feasible. It is hoped that the
Domestic Dispute/Domestic Violence Reporting Program will be continued. 82
CONCLUSION
Ohio's Domestic Violence Act is among the most comprehensive recent
legislation to combat family violence. However, while in some parts of the state
the options available to victims of domestic abuse have improved significantly,
in many places the intended benefits have been largely unrealized. The aims
of the Act could be greatly advanced by local officials committed to a policy
of reducing domestic violence.
Several considerations could enhance the value of the civil domestic violence
protection order. Attorneys should become familiar with this remedy and its
unique features. Courts should make this remedy available to victims with limited
resources by adopting petition forms which could be filled out by a lay person,
and by not charging a filing fee. Costs could be assessed later at the full hear-
ing when the resources and equities of the parties can be examined. The feasi-
bility of making civil protection orders available on an emergency basis, out-
side normal court hours, should be considered. This could reduce the use of
the criminal process by victims who do not intend to pursue prosecution. At
least, courts should hold exparte hearings on the same day they are requested,
as required by the Act. Judges should be willing to exclude the offender from
the shared residence as well as to grant other terms necessary for the well-being
of the petitioner. Civil orders and consent agreements should include provi-
sions expressly authorizing law officers to remove the respondent from the
premises as provided by the statute. Better yet, enforceability could be made
clear by a uniform state law making the violation of either civil or criminal
domestic violence protection orders a misdemeanor. Courts and attorneys should
make sure that copies of the orders are issued to the applicable law enforce-
ment agencies, the place of the petitioner's residence, school and job.
-'Statistics: Police Involvement in Domestic Disputes, testimony by Ohio Legal Services Victim/Witness
Service Center, Dec. 1979.
2111980 Report, supra note 268, at 32-33 and 1981 Report at 32-33.
"'As of the date that this comment went to print, BCI has indicated that it will be continuing the program.
Telephone interview with Cliff Titus, program director, April 25, 1983.
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Domestic violence training should be given to all law officers, not just
new ones as required by the Act. The training should emphasize an under-
standing of the personal dynamics and social pressures of wife abuse as well
as crisis intervention skills. Officers should be able to respond to a domestic
dispute with crisis intervention techniques when appropriate, but they should
also be willing to arrest where a criminal offense has occurred. When there
is a protection order, law officers should be willing to enforce the order, in-
cluding removal of the offender from the premises.
To ensure that victims are informed of their options, all law enforcement
agencies should adopt a statement to be read and handed out which explains
the relief available through a civil protection order or through arrest and a
temporary protection order, and how to obtain either remedy. The statement
may also include key referrals, such as battered women's shelters, legal aid
offices, and the prosecutor. This form should be used on all domestic dispute
runs, not just when a complaint is filed.
After an arrest, a domestic violence defendant should be denied pre-
arraignment release, as permitted by Criminal Rule 46(D), when there are in-
dications that his immediate release may pose a danger to the family or
household member. If he is released, an exparte temporary protection order
should be issued at the same time. In general, municipal courts should be will-
ing to grant temporary protection orders as a way to prevent intimidation of
complaining witnesses. As with civil orders, there should be explicit provisions
describing the power of police to enforce the order by removing the offender
from the premises. Preferably, state or local laws should provide for arrest
upon violation of such orders.
Prosecutors should recognize domestic violence as a crime against the state
and should adopt practices which can promote victim cooperation with pro-
secution. In addition to supporting issuance and enforcement of temporary
protection orders, they should provide referrals to fulfill other victim needs,
including civil remedies and social services, and keep victims informed about
the criminal process. They should avoid making the victim take personal respon-
sibility for prosecution by making it clear to both victim and defendant that
it is the prosecuting attorney who is responsible for the decision to go forward.
They should endeavor to tailor penalties to victim goals, which may mean seek-
ing deferred prosecution or probation conditioned on participation in counseling.
Both municipal courts and domestic relations courts should work with social
service agencies to develop programs for court-ordered counseling. This should
include appropriate treatment as well as effective follow-up.
All law enforcement agencies should participate conscientiously in the
Domestic Dispute/Domestic Violence Reporting Program to allow accurate
statistics on reported domestic disputes and police response. The reporting pro-
gram should not be allowed to expire without an opportunity to assess its value
Spring, 1983]
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with reasonable compliance by enforcement agencies.
The Domestic Violence Act is a thorough piece of legislation whose aims
are often frustrated in practice. But if local officials are willing to commit
themselves to reducing domestic violence and improving the options for vic-
tims, the benefits for victims as well as for the community would be great.
NANCY E. GRIM
APPENDIX
Much of the information in this article was obtained from inquiries to
law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts of common pleas and battered
women's services in thirty counties. Reponses often took the form of direct
responses to a letter-questionnaire sent by the author, but also included copies
of official policy statements and interviews. Listed below are all organizations
which contributed information in this way. The particular sources are also cited
individually throughout the comment, when appropriate. See supra note 17.
All responses and interviews have been verified by the Board of Editors of the
AKRON LAW REVIEW.
Battered Women Shelters
Battered Women's Advisory Committee (Newark, Licking County).
Choices for Victims of Domestic Violence (Columbus, Franklin County)
Community Interfaith Service (Winterville, Jefferson County)
CrossRoads Crisis Center (Lima, Allen County)
Domestic Violence Project (Canton, Stark County)
Genesis House (Lorain, Lorain County)
Homesafe (Ashtabula, Ashtabula County)
My Sister's Place (Athens, Athens County)
Someplace Safe, Inc. (Warren, Trumbull County)
WomanShelter, Inc. (Ravenna, Portage County)
Women Helping Women (Cincinnati, Hamilton County)
YWCA Battered Woman Project (Dayton, Montgomery County)
Courts of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division
Ashtabula County
Crawford County
Cuyaghoa County
Franklin County
Geauga County
Greene County
Lucas County
Mahoning County
[Vol. 16:4
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Law Enforcement Agencies
Akron Police Department
Cleveland Police Department
Columbus Police Department
Dayton Police Department
Youngstown Police Department
Ashtabula County Sheriff's Office
Athens County Sheriff's Office
Lake County Sheriff's Office
Ross County Sheriff's Office
Sandusky County Sheriff's Office
Stark County Sheriff's Office
Trumbull County Sheriff's Office
Wayne County Sheriff's Office
Prosecutors
City of Toledo
Ashtabula County
Licking County
Pike County
Sandusky County
Stark County
Other
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation
Cleveland Victim/Witness Service Center
Council on Family Violence of Lucas County
Crawford County Municipal Court
State Representative David Hartley
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